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FIVE KEY ACTIONS FOR CLEANER, 
MORE AFFORDABLE ELECTRICITY  
This report recommends five key measures to facilitate 
lower electricity bills and carbon emissions through 
greater use of demand management  
1. Australian Energy Market Commission (AEMC) to 
amend the National Electricity Rules to make it clear 
that providing incentives to network businesses is 
desirable to overcome barriers to efficient network 
demand management (DM). 
2. Australian Energy Regulator (AER) to establish an 
effective DM Incentive Scheme (DMIS) that drives 
network DM wherever it will reduce costs to 
consumers.  
3. Distribution network businesses to set DM targets, 
in collaboration with regulators.  
4. Distribution network businesses to report clearly 
and consistently on their DM activities and 
outcomes. 
5. AER to provide effective and efficient DM 
performance incentives to network businesses. 
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Foreword 
Affordable energy is crucial to the Australian 
community. Transitioning to efficient, clean 
energy is essential to sustaining prosperity for 
future generations.  
The Australian electricity market has been failing on both these 
objectives. The reasons for this failure are complex, but sensible, 
effective reforms are available. 
Creating an affordable and sustainable electricity system is 
possible, but requires urgent change. This change involves putting 
citizens’ and consumers’ interests, especially their long-term 
interests, back at the heart of the electricity market. To do this 
would help to fulfil the National Electricity Market’s original 
objective of serving ‘the long-term interests of consumers’.  
Demand management means helping customers to reduce their 
electricity demand as an alternative to building infrastructure. 
Using demand management wherever it is less costly than new 
power lines, substations and power stations is a key element in 
restoring power to the people in the electricity market.  
This report presents a practical agenda to achieve this. 
 
Jeff Angel, CEO, Total Environment Centre 
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SUMMARY: UNLOCKING SAVINGS THROUGH NETWORK DM  
Demand management (DM) involves helping customers reduce their electricity demand as an alternative to building 
infrastructure. It is a key element in restoring power to consumers in the Australian electricity market. Urgent action to 
increase demand management by networks is needed in order to reduce pressure on consumers' electricity bills, and to 
meet the challenges of climate change and the technological evolution away from a centralised supply of electricity. 
INTRODUCTION 
This report presents reform proposals to drive a large increase in cost-
effective network demand management in the Australian electricity industry. 
These proposals are designed to help consumer representatives and their 
allies to advocate cutting customer costs and carbon emissions. The Total 
Environment Centre (TEC) has commissioned the Institute for Sustainable 
Futures (ISF) to prepare this report.  
This report builds on previous research that outlines how the current 
regulatory framework creates significant barriers to the uptake of DM by 
distribution network service providers (DNSPs). In particular, it supports the 
conclusion of the Australian Energy Market Commission (AEMC) that reform 
of regulatory incentives for DM by distribution network service providers 
(DNSPs) is needed. Encouraging DNSPs, who are responsible for a large share 
of electricity costs, to undertake DM to reduce peak demand is also likely to 
encourage greater DM by other parts of the electricity supply industry. 
This report proposes that the key next step is a request to the AEMC for a 
rule change to replace the Demand Management and Embedded Generation 
Connection Incentive Scheme (DMEGCIS) with an effective incentive scheme 
that will drive DM in areas of network constraint wherever it is less costly 
than network infrastructure expenditure. Section 1: Proposals outlines a 
specific rule change proposal, an associated draft DM Incentive Scheme 
(DMIS) structure, and complementary policy measures to ensure that 




What is network demand management? 
Demand management (DM), also known as demand-side management, refers to 
activities that lower or shift the demand for electricity as an alternative to providing 
additional supply. Electricity demand management is usually undertaken by utilities 
responsible for ensuring reliable and adequate supply of electricity, where moderating 
demand is more cost-effective than increasing supply. DM measures are generally 
characterised as peak load management, energy efficiency or distributed generation. 
While network DM is generally focused on reducing peak electricity demand in 
constrained parts of the grid, there are various ways of achieving this. DM measures are 
generally categorised as energy efficiency, peak load management or distributed 
generation. Examples of DM include: 
Energy efficiency 
• Information and education activities to help customers reduce energy waste; 
• Subsidies to replace inefficient lights or equipment; 
• Free installation of weather stripping to reduce leaks around doors/windows; 
• Second refrigerator buyback projects. 
Peak load management 
• Offering householders cash incentives to reduce demand at peak times; 
• Time-of-use pricing to reward customers who shift demand away from peak periods; 
• Funding support for battery storage (e.g. in support of local solar panels); 
• Shifting discretionary loads like pool pumps, storage water heating and EV charging. 
Distributed Generation 
• Incentives to install solar panels in network constrained areas; 
• Subsidies for installation of cogeneration or trigeneration; 
• Occasional use of diesel standby generators to support the grid (or other DM); 
• Use of landfill gas or bioenergy from waste to relieve local network constraints.  
For examples of network DM applied in Australia, see Appendix E. 
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WHY WE NEED TO INCREASE DM IN AUSTRALIA 
Section 2 of this report highlights the importance of demand 
management. There are economic, environmental and 
technological imperatives for urgent action to increase the 
application of DM in our electricity system.  
Recent rapid increases in electricity prices have largely been the 
result of historically high levels of investment in our electricity 
network, particularly in NSW and Queensland. The high levels of 
investment are the result of a ‘supply side’ focus on increasing 
electricity demand, stronger reliability standards and the 
replacement of aging network infrastructure. 
The AEMC has identified substantial demand management 
opportunities in the Australian electricity system, opportunities 
that could lead to savings of $4–$12 billion over the next ten 
years.1 These savings, if passed on to electricity consumers, could  
result in bill reductions of between $120 and $500. Yet a range of regulatory and other barriers is preventing 
the timely take-up of this opportunity by DNSPs.  
Flow-on effects from the reduced demand for electricity generation, such as lower prices in the wholesale 
energy market, would mean that further reductions in costs to consumers could arise. 
While aggregate electricity consumption in the National Electricity Market (NEM) has decreased in recent 
years, both electricity consumption and peak demand are expected to increase over the next decade.2  
Failure to build cost effecitve DM capacity now would leave energy consumers more exposed to risks of 
another price shock, if peak demand growth accelerates  or market conditions change.  
The environmental imperative is also clear. Australia has one of the most carbon intensive economies in the 
world. If we are to meet our international obligations to emission reduction and play our part in avoiding 
dangerous climate change, then our electricity system will need to decarbonise quickly over the coming 
decade.  
Technological change is providing ways to achieve emissions reduction as well as increase the efficiency of 
our current electricity systems. The take-up of distributed generation (such as solar photovoltaic panels) is 
already impacting on the electricity system. This trend is likely to accelerate, particularly when combined with 





Why we need network DM 
 Electricity prices more than doubled between 
2007 and 20133 
 Network charges now make up half of the 
average Australian electricity bill according to the 
Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism.4 
 Networks are investing more than $40 billion in 
electricity distribution and transmission networks 
in the current 5 year regulatory period.5 
 An estimated one-third of the current investment 
in Australian networks is to cater for growth, and 
in particular, growth in peak demand. 
 The Productivity Commission estimates that peak 
demand events occur for less than forty hours 
per year (or less than 1% of the time) yet they 
account for approximately 25% of the average 
residential bill. 6 
 Current demand management is equal to less 
than 2% of NEM-wide peak demand7 and only 
about 1% of the generation capacity in the NEM.8 
 It is estimated that $2.2 billion per year of 
avoidable network costs are being passed on to 
consumers Australia-wide.9 
 The economic cost savings of peak demand 
reduction in the NEM are estimated to be 
between $4.3 billion and $11.8 billion over the 
next ten years. This translates into approximately 
$500 of savings per customer each year in South 
Australia and Queensland, $350 in New South 
Wales and $120 in Victoria.10 
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STATUS: WHERE WE ARE AT  
Section 3 considers the current status of DM. According to the latest available 
estimates, demand management reduced demand for electricity by 
approximately 700MW in Australia in 2010–11, and about half of this was from 
network DM projects. While this is almost double the amount from 2009–10, it 
is still very low in an electricity system with more than 45,000 MW of 
generation capacity, and represents only about 2% of total peak demand. 11 
The size and uptake of the current demand management incentive scheme is 
also low. The total allowance available in the current regulatory period is $36.5 
million across the 13 DNSPs operating in the NEM. The yearly allowance ranges 
between $100,000 and $1 million depending on the size of the DNSPs. Only 
13% of this has so far been claimed. 
There are currently numerous institutional barriers to efficient uptake of DM in 
the NEM. These include: regulatory barriers, cultural bias, imperfect 
information, split incentives, payback gaps, inefficient pricing and the confusion 
generated by the interplay of the other barriers. Specific issues with regulation 
include the lack of an overarching policy imperative, a bias towards network 
augmentation over DM, inflexible deterministic reliability criteria and 
disincentives for DM. 
Several reform processes have recently been implemented or are currently in 
train to respond to the above problems. However, while important, these 
reforms do not yet comprehensively address all of the barriers to DM. 
 
OPPORTUNITIES: WHAT CAN WE DO 
Section 4 outlines options for the reform of incentives for DM. Some important 
reforms have emerged from the recent array of inquiries into DM and network 
efficiency. However, most of these reforms are still far from being implemented 
and there are also some key gaps which need to be addressed.  
This report identifies five priority actions to support efficient network DM: 
1. Australian Energy Market Commission to amend the National Electricity 
Rules to make it clear that providing incentives to network businesses is 
desirable to overcome barriers to efficient network DM. 
2. Australian Energy Regulator to establish an effective DM incentive scheme 
(DMIS) that drives DM wherever it will reduce costs to consumers.  
3. Distribution network businesses to set DM targets, in collaboration with 
regulators.  
4. Distribution network businesses to report clearly and consistently on their 
DM activities and outcomes. 
5. Australian Energy Regulator to provide effective and efficient DM 




Watt’s in a name? DMIS vs. DMEGCIS 
The current legislation instructs the AER to develop a Demand Management 
and Embedded Generation Connection Incentive Scheme (DMEGCIS), to 
provide incentives for DNSPs to ‘implement efficient non-network 
alternatives, or to manage the expected demand for standard control services 
in some other way, or to efficiently connect embedded generators’. For 
brevity, this report adopts the earlier and simpler term, Demand 
Management Incentive Scheme (DMIS).  
This is not intended to imply that issues around connecting distributed 
generation and storage are unimportant and nor is it intended downplay the 
related challenges. Important work on these issues is currently under way 
(e.g. the Climateworks et al. rule change on connecting embedded 
generators).9 Distributed generation and storage are included in the 
definition of demand management above, and the proposed scheme outlined 
here is intended to remove the current disincentives that mean DNSPs can be 
financially disadvantaged by connecting distributed generation. 
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1 PROPOSALS: DM REGULATORY REFORM & OTHER MEASURES This section presents key changes to ensure network DM is used wherever it will benefit consumers. 
The proposed reforms include three elements: 
 A change to the National Electricity Rules to support network DM 
 A reformed DM Incentive Scheme (DMIS), to be established by the Australian Energy Regulator 
 Complementary policy reforms, to be adopted by government. 
While these proposals are not definitive, they are intended provide a specific, concrete foundation for 
debate and an impetus for urgent reform. 
PROPOSED NEW DM INCENTIVE SCHEME RULE  
Draft specification for the proposed rule change to reform application of the existing Demand Management and Embedded Generation 
Connection Incentive Scheme. 
Note: This proposed Rule Is modelled closely on the draft specifications from the AEMC ‘Power of Choice’ report. The edits which show how this rule varies from the AEMC’s 
proposal are included in Appendix B, whilst Appendix A contains the current Rule as it stands. . Notes in the pink boxes provide explanatory text to the proposed Rule. 
Objective: The objective of this proposed rule change is to reform the current demand management incentive scheme to support appropriate incentives for distribution 
network service providers (DNSPs) to pursue efficient demand management (DM). The incentive scheme will be developed with an overarching objective and supporting 
principles. The AER should have sufficient discretion to develop the detailed design of the scheme – which may contain multiple mechanisms – and the flexibility to adapt the 
application of the scheme to the individual circumstances of each distribution business. 
Application: Proposed rule change to replace current National Electricity Rules clause 6.6.3. 
 
Objective of DMIS 
To incentivise efficient DM projects and pricing 





1. Demand Management Incentive Scheme 
 The AER shall publish an incentive scheme or schemes (demand management incentive scheme or DMIS) to provide 
incentives for DNSPs to implement efficient DM options. 
 DM options include ‘DM projects’ which involve the DNSP offering assistance, funding or other incentives (financial 
or otherwise) to encourage consumers to reduce or shift demand, and ‘price-based DM’, which involves changing 
the structure of network pricing to encourage DM. DM projects may also include a price-based component.  
 The scheme must be applied in a manner consistent with the following objective: ‘to provide an appropriate return 
to the network businesses for DM projects which deliver a net cost saving to their consumers’: 









The DMIS as developed by the AER will need to 
contain criteria for efficient DM. 
 
 










Reporting on DM project outcomes 
 




o DM projects are defined as any conscious use by the DNSP of non-network solutions including demand 
response, energy efficiency or embedded or distributed generation to reduce load at risk, improve reliability 
or defer the expenditure of capital on the network. 
o Efficient DM is defined for the purposes of the incentive scheme as any DM project that delivers a net benefit 
to consumers as a whole, regardless of where in the electricity supply value chain those benefits arise. 
 The AER has the option to include the DMIS as part of the DNSPs distribution determination. The application of the 
scheme can differ by DNSP. 
 The AER can amend the incentive scheme in accordance with the distribution consultation procedures. 
 The demand management incentive scheme must be applied in a manner consistent with the following principles: 
o DM projects should address (current and/or anticipated) network issues in order to qualify for inclusion in the 
incentive scheme (potential network issues include: network supply capacity, reliability, asset replacement 
and changing demand or local generation patterns). 
o Expenditure on DM projects approved under this scheme must be treated equitably with other network 
expenditure approved under the determination process. 
o Notwithstanding the above, consideration of funding for qualifying DM projects shall recognise the need to 
incentivise network DM over the long term, and not just for the forthcoming regulatory period. 
o Payments to customers or other providers of DM services under the scheme should reflect consideration of 
timing to smooth the bill impact on consumers. 
o The scheme design should be as simple as practicable to apply, such that it is easy to understand, implement 
and administer for all market participants. 
o The scheme should contribute to achieving a material change that maximises in the amount of efficient DM in 
the market. 
 As one purpose of the incentive scheme shall be to build capability among DNSPs in planning and implementing 
DM, the scheme should include requirements regarding the monitoring of DM project outcomes and publication of 
results as a means for maximising the impact of the incentive scheme expenditures. 
 In developing the demand management incentive scheme, the AER must have regard to: 
o where available, past experience (in Australia and internationally) including costs, benefits and outcomes 
for comparative DM services;  
o the need to consider in the cost-benefit assessment the value to customers participating in the DM project 
of any significant additional cost or benefit of their participation (including the electricity they would have 



















DNSPs may retain some non-network 
market benefits of DM 
 
The AEMC ‘Power of Choice’ review noted that 
the average maximum incentive that can be 
earned by the network business in the USA is 
about 11 per cent of net benefits. Ausgrid 
proposed a 30% cap while other network 
businesses suggested no cap at all. 
The AEMC proposed the maximum percentage 
share should be a matter for the AER to decide. 
The 50% maximum proposed here leaves much 
discretion to the AER while also providing some 
guidance. While this might seem unduly 
generous to DNSPs, it is arguably essential in 
order to balance the longstanding bias in favour 
of network infrastructure and against DM. 
used or wasted except for that participation); 
o range of market benefits permitted under the regulatory investment test for distribution; 
o the effect of the particular control mechanism to which the DNSP is subject on incentives to adopt or 
implement efficient non-network alternatives; 
o the extent a distributor is able to offer efficient pricing structures; 
o any possible interaction with other incentive schemes;  
o the need to develop an efficient, fair and competitive market  for DM services; 
o the willingness of customers to pay for any increases in costs or prices resulting from the implementation 
of the scheme; and 
o the distribution of any benefits of reduced costs or bills resulting from the implementation of the scheme. 
 The AER shall decide what information is needed from the DNSPs to monitor the application of the demand 
management incentive scheme and to verify outcomes. 
 The AER shall publish the demand management incentive scheme no later than nine months after the 
commencement of this rule. 
2. Calculation of the share of non-network market benefits and DM performance incentives 
 Recognising the barriers to network DM, the AER shall provide DNSPs with incentives to undertake efficient DM. 
 Under the scheme, the DNSP is permitted to retain a share of associated non-network related market benefits of 
DM as determined by the AER, if 
a) the network has made a material contribution to this DM, and  
b) the DM is unlikely to have been delivered without this network support. 
 The share of associated non-network related market benefits retained by the DNSP must be proportional to the net 
benefits delivered to the market. 
 The maximum percentage of non-network related market benefits which can be retained by DNSPs shall be 
determined by the AER but should not exceed 50% (the actual percentage can vary by business and by time). 
 Any standardised values for non-network benefits used to calculate the value of the incentive must be broadly 
consistent with the RIT-D guidelines. 
 Methodologies used to determine the extent of the consumer demand response should be consistent with baseline 
consumption methodologies approved for the demand response mechanism proposed for the wholesale market 
where the circumstances are similar, except where the DNSP can provide justification for a different value being 
used. 













DM Innovation Allowance to support 






DNSPs able to recover lost revenue  
The original AEMC rule change includes 
foregone profit. However, recovery of foregone 
revenue instead of profit will provide a 
financial incentive for DNSPs to undertake DM 





3. Innovation Allowance 
 The AER shall establish a DM innovation allowance scheme for research and development activities related to DM.  
 The innovation allowance scheme shall provide funding for, and an incentive to, DNSPs to undertake activities that 
will increase their knowledge regarding (a) the ability of different approaches (both technology- and pricing-based) 
to achieve useful and reliable demand reductions, (b) the costs of those approaches, and (c) their impacts (if any) 
on network systems operations. 
 The AER has the flexibility to determine the amount of the innovation allowance for each distribution business 
(noting that these amounts could vary by business and over time). 
 The AER has the discretion to develop the design of the innovation allowance scheme subject to the scheme being 
simple for it and the DNSPs to administer (i.e., that its associated transaction costs are appropriate). 
 Businesses must provide all relevant information and data arising from such pilots/trials approved under this 
scheme to the AER in a timely manner and that all such information be available for publication unless reason for 
confidentiality is established to the satisfaction of the AER 
 Results of the projects approved under this scheme must be published in the DNSP's distribution annual planning 
report. 
4. Include allowance for foregone revenue under the DMIS 
 In order to treat DM equally with other network expenditure, the AER shall ensure that allowance is made to allow 
DNSPs to recover revenue lost as a consequence of the DNSP undertaking any approved DM project. (Note: in the 
case of DNSPs operating under a revenue cap control mechanism, there will not be foregone revenue.) 
 Revenue lost by the DNSP is only recoverable in relation to DM projects undertaken by the DNSP. 
 In calculating foregone revenue, the AER must have regard to the tariff structure of the DNSP. 
5. Capital and Operating Expenditure Objectives 
 Amend NER Clauses 6.5.6 (a) to (c) and 6.5.7(a) to (c) to enable the AER to consider potential non-network benefits 
when assessing the efficiency of proposed DM activities included in business revenue proposal. 
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PROPOSED NEW DM INCENTIVE SCHEME  
This section proposes a reformed DMIS for DNSPs to be established by the AER following the rule change process. This scheme 
would replace the current very modest and ineffective Demand Management and Embedded Generation Connection Incentive 
Scheme (DMEGCIS). The following proposals are not intended to be definitive. Instead, they provide a framework and a focus for 
debate and consultation on the development of a DMIS. The notes in the pink boxes provide explanatory notes to the proposed DMIS.  
 
Summary 
The rule change above is intended to clarify the 
intent of the NER relating to DM. However, to 
have an impact, the above DMIS rule must be 
enacted by the AER by establishing a DM Incentive 
Scheme (DMIS). This section proposes key 




Of the nine principles listed here, only ‘efficiency’ 
and ‘reliability’ are specifically mentioned in the 
National Electricity Objective (NEO). However, it 
can be argued that each of the other seven is 
consistent with serving the  ‘long-term interests of 
consumers’ aspect of the NEO.13 
 
 
Objective: The overarching objective of this Demand Management Incentive Scheme (DMIS) is to provide 
appropriate incentives for distribution network service providers (DNSPs) to pursue efficient demand management 
(DM) projects and pricing.  
The supporting principles of the DMIS include: 
 Efficiency: The Scheme is intended to maximise the application of cost-effective DM in support of the long-
term interests of consumers. 
 Fairness: The Scheme is intended to provide an equitable distribution of the benefits and costs of DM 
between DNSPs, their customers , their shareholders, and DM service providers, and between consumers who 
participate and non-participating consumers.  
 Sustainability: The Scheme should enhance environmental sustainability. 
 Simplicity: Recognising that complexity creates cost and erodes efficiency, the scheme should be as simple as 
possible, consistent with its objective and these principles. 
 Transparency: Recognising that improving efficiency over time depends on shared learning, and fairness 
depends on accountability, the operation of this scheme should be based on transparency and clear, concise 
and consistent reporting. 
 Competitive neutrality: The Scheme should ensure that DM options and service providers are not 
disadvantaged relative to network or centralised generation options and service providers.  
 Reliability: The Scheme should support a balanced approach to electricity supply reliability, reflecting the 
preferences and interests of customers and reflecting the potential of DM to support and enhance reliability.  
 Foresight: The Scheme should respond to current and anticipated market and technology developments. 
 Flexibility: The Scheme contains multiple elements – and is intended to be flexible in order to accommodate 
the individual circumstances of each DNSP. 
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Form of control: ‘decoupling’  
Economic regulation that links the revenue of the 
DNSP to the volume of electricity consumed by its 
customers (e.g. price caps) can be a powerful 
disincentive to DM by DNSP. ‘Decoupling’ revenue 
from energy consumption addresses this 
disincentive.  
 
DM Plans vs. ‘Demand Side Engagement 
Strategy’ 
The National Electricity Rules (NER) were recently 
changed to require DNSPs to publish a ‘Demand Side 
Engagement Document’ (NER, clause 5.13.1). 
Unlike the Demand Side Engagement Document, the 
DM Plan would include the DNSP’s proposed DM 
options for implementation, and for budget and 
target outcomes, and would do so in parallel with 
developing plans for network investment in their 
regulatory proposal. 
Criteria: For the purposes of this Scheme, DM projects are characterised as follows: 
 DM projects are any deliberate uses by the DNSP of non-network solutions including demand response, energy 
efficiency, embedded or distributed generation or energy storage to reduce load at risk, improve reliability or 
defer or avoid the expenditure on network infrastructure and electricity supply. 
 Efficient DM is defined as any DM project that delivers a net benefit to consumers, regardless of where in the 
electricity supply value chain those benefits arise. 
 DM projects should address (current and/or anticipated) network issues in order to qualify for inclusion in the 
incentive scheme. Network issues may include: network supply capacity, reliability, asset replacement and 
changing demand or local generation patterns. 
 DM projects may be identified either through the DNSP regulatory proposal, the R IT –D process or through the 
DNSP’s Demand Side Engagement Strategy. 
 DM projects must be subject to a transparent measurement and verification process which clearly 
demonstrates the associated outcomes, costs and benefits. 
1. Form of control (Decoupling DNSP revenue from electricity consumption) 
The AER shall ensure that the regulatory form of control provides equal treatment of DM relative to network 
investment (i.e. it should provide a ‘level playing field’). 
This should be achieved either through a revenue cap (as is currently applied in Queensland and as is proposed for 
NSW for the next regulatory period), or in the absence of a revenue cap, an alternative form of decoupling, such as a 
D-Factor (although this is much more complex and has had very limited success in NSW). 
2. Regulatory proposals and DM Plan 
Each DNSP shall submit as part of its as regulatory proposal a proposed DM Plan. The proposed DM Plan should 
include DM projects and pricing it proposes to implement and annual targets in terms of reductions below ‘business 
as usual’ for: peak demand, energy consumption, capital expenditure and customer bills. It should also include the 
expected impact on network charges.  
The proposed DM Plan should include a budget of proposed capital and operating expenditure to implement it. 
The AER shall evaluate the proposed DM Plan in relation to other network expenditure and determine whether: the 
proposed DM is efficient; the targets are sufficient; and the proposed expenditure is prudent. 
AER shall approve proposed DM expenditure considered prudent and include it as part of the DNSP’s regulatory 
determination. 
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DM targets & nominated DM performance 
Targets 
It can be argued that peak demand is not the best 
criterion for nominated performance targets, as it 
does not take account of the value of the specific 
network investment avoided by DM or the value of 
savings to customers. However, as it is a relatively 
simple criterion, it is suggested here as the best basis 























3. DM targets and ‘Nominated Performance Targets’ 
The AER shall consider the DNSP’s DM Plan in assessing overall DNSP expenditure proposals and where considered 
appropriate, adopt the DNSP’s proposed annual DM targets for the purpose of awarding the DNSP a DM 
performance incentive. These targets shall be referred to as the annual DM Nominated Performance Targets. 
If the DNSP has not specified DM targets, or if the AER considers the proposed DM targets are not appropriate, the 
AER may consult with the DNSP to set alternative DM Nominated Performance Targets for the DNSP.  
The Nominated Performance Targets (NPTs) shall be based on reductions in peak demand as a result of DNSPs 
implementing DM options. The AER shall specify whether the DNSP’s Nominated Performance Targets shall be based 
on: 
 network-wide coincident peak demand or the sum of diversified (local) peak demand;  
 summer or winter peak demand , or a composite of both; and 
 reduction in peak demand below ‘business as usual’, or reduction in peak demand directly attributed to 
DNSP DM activity, or a composite of both. 
In considering DM targets, the AER shall take account of any announced policy of the Standing Committee on Energy 
and Resources in relation to DM or DM targets. 
4. Reporting DM performance 
Each DNSP shall submit to the AER an annual DM performance report advising of performance against targets and 
criteria, including: 
1. Peak demand and energy consumption vs. business as usual forecast: How do peak summer and winter 
demand (MWp) and annual energy consumption (GWh p.a.) in the past five years compare to the business-
as-usual levels forecast in their network pricing determinations? 
2. DM performance: How much have coincident peak summer and winter demand (MWp) and annual energy 
consumption (GWh p.a.) been reduced across the DNSP’s network system in the current year as a result of 
DM options that the DNSP has supported over the past five years? 
3. Savings: By how much have the DNSP’s capital and operating expenditure been reduced (or increased) as a 
consequence of points 1 and 2? By how much have customer energy bills been reduced in the current year 
as a result of points 1 and 2? 
4. Revenue and price impact: What has been the impact on DNSP revenue and network charges of DM options 
undertaken over the past five years? 
Based on an assessment of the annual DNSP DM performance reports, the AER shall determine the annual deemed 
DM Performance (DMP) of demand reduction for each DNSP relative to its Nominated Performance Target. 
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DM performance incentives 
The DM performance incentive is intended to create 
a direct financial incentive for DNSPs to undertake 
DM comparable to the incentive to earn a return on 
additional network investment.  
This incentive in effect allows the DNSPs to recover a 
share of the benefits of DM that would otherwise 
accrue to customers or retailers. By allowing DNSPs 
a share in these ‘non-network market benefits’, it is 
intended to deliver efficient DM and its benefits that 
would otherwise be lost to the market altogether.  
The DM Performance Allowance is only payable on 
performance beyond a given threshold as recovery 
of DNSP’s DM expenditure should in the main, be 
incorporated into the normal expenditure recovery 
mechanisms of the regulatory determination. 
 
 
Earning a return on DM 
If linking the ‘Peak Demand Coefficient’ to the size of 
a DNSP’s existing Regulated Asset Base (RAB) is 
considered to penalise DNSPs with smaller RABs due 
to more efficient past network investment, then a 











5. DM performance incentives 
The AER shall specify a performance threshold (for example, 80%) for the annual DM Nominated Performance 
Target. Where a DNSP’s actual DM performance exceeds the performance threshold in a given year, the DNSP shall 
be permitted to recover through their network charges in the subsequent year an additional DM Performance 
Allowance. 
The DM Performance Allowance shall be calculated as follows: 
DMPA = DMP(t) x WACC x CAPEX PDC,  
where: 
DMPA is the DM Performance Allowance 
DMP(t) = DMP - Ɵ.NPT 
i.e. the Peak Demand Reduction performance (DMP) beyond the performance threshold (Ɵ) of their 
Nominated Performance Target (NPT) 
WACC = the Weighted Average Cost of Capital  
CAPEX PDC = RAB/PD 
i.e. the Capital Expenditure ‘Peak Demand Coefficient’ (CAPEX PDC), the DNSP’s Regulated Asset Base (RAB) 
divided by its the network-wide peak demand (PD) 
The DM Performance Allowance is intended to allow the DNSP to ‘earn a return’ on efficient DM expenditure 
performance equivalent to the financial return on network investment. The CAPEX PDC is intended to reflect the 
average value of avoided network capex per unit of peak demand reduction achieved through DM. 
The DM Performance Allowance will be available to DNSPs based on the annual DM performance report relative to 
their DM Performance Target. 
The DM Performance Allowance will be available for DM Performance above a minimum performance threshold 
(such as for example 80% of the annual DM Performance Target) and up to DM performance cap (such as for 
example, 150% of the annual DM Performance Target). The DM performance cap shall also be specified by the AER. 
The non-network market benefits of DM shall be considered by the AER in setting the DM Performance Allowance. 
6. Opex/capex offset  
The AER shall ensure that the DNSP will not be disadvantaged if it increases operating expenditure on DM, if such 
increased operating expenditure is more than offset by reductions in capital expenditure. 
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DM benefits between regulatory periods 
This provision ensures that if a DNSP avoids building 
infrastructure in the current regulatory period by 
undertaking efficient DM instead, then their 
profitability in the next regulatory period will not be 
reduced. The DNSPs will not be disadvantaged while 
consumers will benefit from lower overall costs. 
It is recognised that this issue will need to be 
considered in concert with setting appropriate 
regulated rates of return for investment for DNSPs.   
There have been many suggestions that the 
weighted average cost of capital (WACC) has long 
been set too high which has exacerbated incentives 
for network businesses to over-invest in 
infrastructure.  
 
DM Innovation Allowance 
The existing Innovation Allowance is retained as a 
relatively minor part of the new broader DMIS. 
 
7. Inter-period rollover 
The AER shall take account of current and future capital expenditure deferred or avoided through DM in setting 
allowable revenue for DNSPs in its regulatory determinations. In doing so, the AER shall ensure that DNSPs 
undertaking DM are not disadvantaged relative to what their allowable revenue would have been had they further 









8. DM Innovation Allowance 
In each DNSP regulatory determination, the AER shall establish a DM Innovation Allowance (DMIA) to provide 
funding for, and an incentive to, DNSPs to undertake activities that will increase their own and their stakeholders’ 
knowledge regarding: 
a) the ability of technology- and pricing-based approaches to achieve useful and reliable demand reductions;  
b) the costs of those approaches; and  
c) their impacts (if any) on network systems’ operations. 
While the DMIA will not be the main means of supporting network DM, it shall be an important component of the 
DMIS to support innovative and experimental DM for which it is difficult to anticipate outcomes. 
The funding for the DMIA for each DNSP shall be set by the AER at a level commensurate with the opportunity for 
such innovative DM to benefit the long-term interests of consumers. 
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COMPLEMENTARY POLICY REFORM: TARGETS, REPORTING, INCENTIVES AND OBJECTIVES 
In order to give the AEMC and AER greater confidence in 
implementing the proposed rule and proposed DMIS, four 
clarifications of government policy are desirable. 
The above proposed DMIS rule change and the proposed DMIS are regulatory 
changes. If adopted, these reforms are likely to significantly increase the 
uptake on network DM to the benefit of energy consumers and network 
owners. The AER can only adopt a DMIS consistent with the National Electricity 
Rules, and the AEMC can only adopt a rule change consistent with explicit 
government policy. This policy is set out most powerfully by the National 
Electricity Law and other legislation and is articulated by federal, state and 
territory ministers, in particular through the Standing Committee on Energy 
and Resources.  
It would appear that the above proposed reforms are consistent with existing 
policy, so no change in law or policy is required to adopt them. However, both 
the AER and AEMC are by nature cautious institutions that are careful not to be 
seen to be ‘making policy’. In order to give the AEMC and AER greater 
confidence to facilitate these reforms, four clarifications of government policy 
reform are desirable. In each case, the form of clarification could range from a 
simple statement of policy intent to more substantive measures.  
In each case, the best channel for policy clarification would be via the Standing 
Committee on Energy and Resources. However, if this is impractical for some 
reason, then the federal government (or even state or territory governments) 
could act. 
The proposed DMIS structure above incorporates three of the four desired 
clarifications. However, should these not be addressed through the final DMIS, 
they will require complementary measures. To the extent that they are not 
incorporated, the following discussion suggests some additional steps that 
could be taken to implement them. 
The four key elements requiring clarification are:  
1. DM targets 
It is commonplace for organisations and governments to set explicit targets in 
pursuit of a stated objective. If a DM incentive scheme is intended to support DM, 
then it follows that DM targets in some form should apply to DNSPs. The softest 
way of applying such targets would be for government to state that DM targets 
are a desirable component of a DMIS. Even this simple statement would be 
valuable in giving the AEMC and AER more confidence and clarity in establishing 
an effective DMIS. 
However, there is a very wide spectrum of further steps that governments could 
take, such as (in rough order of increasing stringency): 
 specify the preferred time period (e.g. annual targets) or the units for 
measurement of DM targets (e.g. MW peak demand, $ value of customer 
savings, etc.) 
 ask DNSPs to nominate their own voluntary targets 
 convene a discussion with DNSPs and other stakeholders, potentially via the 
AER’s Consumer Challenge Panel, to consider appropriate collective targets, 
 set an indicative level for targets (e.g. 3000 MW or $1 billion p.a. by 2017) 
 set indicative targets for individual DNSPs 
 state that if appropriate targets are not set (and met), then mandatory targets 
will be imposed 
 legislate to impose mandatory targets (it should be noted that this option is 
likely to be the most complex and time consuming). 
The AER does effectively accept performance levels for reliability and service 
levels in making its five-yearly network revenue determinations, so to seek and 
consider DM targets from DNSPs would be within its current responsibilities. 
However, the AER has previously stated that the setting of targets is a broader 
policy decision that goes beyond the AER’s responsibilities in respect of applying 
chapter 6 of the NER to DNSPs.14 For this reason government policy guidance on 
targets would be helpful.  
For further discussion of possible DM targets see the Investing in Savings report.15 
1. DM targets 
2. DM performance reporting 
3. DM incentives  
4. DM policy objectives. 
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2. DM performance reporting 
Equally important to setting targets to achieve an organisational objective is 
measuring and reporting performance in pursuit of that objective. While this should 
be self-evident, there has hitherto been no formal or standardised performance 
reporting in relation to network DM in Australia. 
Again, the simplest policy clarification in this regard would be for government to 
note that public reporting of DM performance by DNSPs would be desirable in the 
context of a DMIS.  
Beyond this, there is a range of further steps that governments could take, such as: 
 inviting DNSPs and other stakeholders to participate in a collaborative 
consultation process to refine the detailed reporting template and 
guidelines 
 specifying the period and format for DM performance reporting (such as 
those indicated in point 4 in the Proposed DMIS above) 
 collating DNSP performance reporting into an annual consolidated national 
report on network DM 
 benchmarking DM performance in Australia against international practice.  
The AER’s recently established Consumer Challenge Panel could play a valuable role  
in advising and reviewing in relation to DM performance reporting.  For further 
discussion of DM performance reporting see the Investing in Savings report.16 
 
3. DM incentives 
While it might seem self-evident that a DM Incentive Scheme should include 
specific financial incentives, clarification of government policy relating to DM 
incentives would be helpful. As a minimum, it would be valuable for there to be a 
clear government statement recognising that cost-effective DM, including energy 
efficiency, in the Australian electricity market is under-utilised as a result of a 
number of regulatory, cultural and other barriers, and specific incentives to 
redress these barriers are warranted.  
Such a statement would give confidence to the AER to establish specific incentives 
for DM in the DM Incentive Scheme. 
Stronger policy of support for DM incentives could include establishing incentives 
directly, including through the new federal government’s direct action policy to 
reduce carbon emissions. Other options for DM incentives are included in the 
Investing in Savings report.17 
However, provided the DMIS establishes effective financial incentives, the need 
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4. Clarifying DM policy objectives 
The failure of electricity regulation in Australia to support cost-effective DM is 
partly due to an absence of clear government policy commitment in support of 
DM.  Indeed, the deliberate exclusion of the environment as an element in the 
National Electricity Objective (NEO) may have inadvertently encouraged this 
neglect by encouraging regulators to disregard DM as primarily an 
environmental matter, in spite of its clear economic benefits. 
To remove this uncertainty, the Federal Minister for Energy, either in his/her 
own right or through the Standing Committee on Energy and Resources, could 
request that the AER take all reasonable steps within its power, and consistent 
with the National Electricity Rules, to facilitate cost-effective network DM. 
(Similar requests could be made to the Western Australian Economic 
Regulatory Authority (ERA) and the Northern Territory Government in relation 
to the regulation on network DM in those jurisdictions.) 
A more compelling way to clarify government policy intent in this area would 
be to amend the NEO to include explicit reference to demand management and 
environmental criteria for the long-term interests of consumers, in addition to 




In contrast to Australia, several overseas electricity markets currently have 
embedded social and environmental objectives. Examples include: 
 The UK, where the principal regulator, the Office of Gas and Electricity 
Markets (OFGEM) is required to observe the following electricity market 
objective: 
The Authority's principal objective is to protect the interests of existing and 
future consumers in relation to gas conveyed through pipes and electricity 
conveyed by distribution or transmission systems. The interests of such 
consumers are their interests taken as a whole, including their interests in the 
reduction of greenhouse gases and in the security of the supply of gas and 
electricity to them.19 
 Canada, where the Canadian National Energy Board, the body tasked with 
regulating energy development in the Canadian public interest, has defined 
public interest as: 
Inclusive of all Canadians and refers to a balance of economic, environmental 
and social considerations that changes as society’s values and preferences 
evolve over time.20 
However, to effect such a change in Australia would likely take quite some time to 
achieve and governments and regulators have for many years resisted such 
suggestions.  
Whether clarification of DM policy objectives is required in practice depends on 
how the AEMC and the AER choose to interpret the National Electricity Rules and 
the National Electricity Objective.  The requirement to protect the long term 
interests of consumers and to promote economic efficiency should be sufficient to 
drive the AEMC to pursue the adoption of cost-effective DM as proposed in the 
rule change and DMIS as outlined in this report.  However, if the AEMC and/or the 
AER judge that current policy and legislation is not sufficient to justify reducing 
costs to consumers through effective DM, then they should clearly and specifically 
identify this policy deficiency, so that government can rectify it. 
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2 
IMPORTANCE: WHY WE NEED TO ACT ON NETWORK DM 
High levels of investment in electricity network infrastructure have led to high electricity bills and a 
carbon intensive economy. The pressure on electricity bills, plus the twin pressures from climate 
change and rapid technological change, makes urgent action on demand management imperative. 
THE ECONOMIC IMPERATIVE 
Demand management has been under-utilised in Australia for 
many years. Consequently, peak demand, investments in 
network infrastructure and electricity prices have all been rising. 
Expenditure on electricity network infrastructures have increased sharply: in the 
current five-year regulatory period more than $45 billion is being invested. This 
amount is larger than expenditure on the National Broadband Network (and over a 
shorter timescale), yet until recently has not been subject to the same level of 
scrutiny. An estimated one-third of the current investment in the networks is to 
cater for growth, and in particular, growth in peak demand, despite peak demand 
events occurring for less than forty hours per year (or less than 1% of the time).21 
Electricity prices have doubled between 2007 and 2013 as DNSPs recoup their 
investment from consumers, with network charges now making up half of the 
average Australian electricity bill (see Figure 1 and 2 over the page).  
What is peak demand?  
Peak demand (or peak loads) is a 
measure of the highest points of 
instantaneous use of electricity in a 
year. Peaks generally occur on 
particularly hot or cold days, when 
consumers use a lot of electricity to heat 
or cool buildings. Electricity networks 
must be built to reliably accommodate 
these peaks, even if this capacity is only 
needed for very short periods of time. 
 
The cost to consumers may continue to increase unless a greater 
emphasis is placed on demand management to meet peak demand. 
Despite a recent decline in total electricity consumption, peak demand growth is 
projected to continue to increase over the next decade22, placing further upward 
pressure on electricity networks, and therefore on electricity prices and bills.  
At the same time, as electricity demand becomes ‘peakier’ (i.e. it is characterised by 
periods of higher maximum demand compared to average demand) the investment 
that is made to augment the network becomes less economically efficient. This has 
been noted in the recent dramatic decline in 
electricity network productivity.23 
Even if consumers reduce their electricity 
consumption, electricity prices will continue 
to rise (at least in the short term), as DNSPs 
continue to recover their “sunk” network 
infrastructure investments over a smaller 
sales volume. Moreover, if electricity 
consumption falls, DNSPs are likely to recover 
the associated decline in revenue by 
increasing the daily fixed charge component 
on bills, further reducing consumers’ capacity 
to control electricity bills. Encouraging DNSP’s 
to invest in DM instead of more supply 
infrastructure can give customers more 
control over their bills and DNSPs greater 
control over their costs.  
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Figure 1: Components of a typical NSW electricity bill, 2007/08 and 2012/13* 
 
Source: IPART (2012) Review of regulated retail prices and charges for electricity 2013 to 2016. 
* It is understood that GST is included in the cost figure for each component, though this is not 
made explicit. 
Figure 2: Components of electricity prices by state, 2011/12 
 
Source: AEMC Future Possible Retail Electricity Price Movements, 2010; Treasury modelling   
(*Vic = 2012 calendar year) 
Figure 1 shows the network cost component of an average bill in NSW more than doubling over the last five years (an increase of $654, from $505 in 2007/08 to $1,159 in 
2012/13). Figure 2 shows that the network cost component is also substantial in other states, particularly in Queensland and South Australia, though it makes up a smaller 
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There are substantial opportunities for demand management in Australia. Uptake of these opportunities could lead to savings of $4–12 
billion over the next 10 years, which could save consumers between $120 and $500 on their electricity bills each year. 
Australia is currently experiencing an unprecedented level of electricity network 
investment with over $45 billion of capital expenditure (capex) in the period 
2010 to 201424.  As indicated in Figure 3, about one third of this capex is 
identified as augmentation or “growth related”.  Much of this growth related 
capex is potentially avoidable or deferrable by using DM to reduce demand 
growth.  The remainder of this capex is primarily driven by other factors such as 
replacement of ageing infrastructure or changes to reliability standards.  Some 
of this investment is also potentially avoidable though DM.  
According to the Australian Energy Market Commission (AEMC), it is estimated 
that the ‘economic cost savings of peak demand reduction in the National 
Electricity Market (NEM) is likely to be between $4.3 billion to $11.8 billion over 
the next ten years … which equates to between 3 per cent and 9 per cent of 
total forecast expenditure on the supply side’.25 These savings include cost 
reductions associated with avoided network capital expenditure. The upper and 
lower ranges of these figures and their composition are shown in Figure 4. The 
main contributing factors underlying the two scenarios are demand-based 
pricing (efficient pricing and demand response) and energy efficiency. 
Assuming these cost savings are passed on to customers, total network charges 
should fall as the need for network augmentation to meet peak demand falls. 
The extent of the savings to customers will be different across jurisdictions of 
the NEM, with regions with strong peak demand growth expected to benefit the 
most. For the AEMC review, Frontier Economics forecast savings of 
approximately $500 per consumer per annum in South Australia and 
Queensland, $350 in New South Wales and $120 in Victoria.26 
Increased peak demand management will also have implications for the price of 
electricity generation. If peak demand decreases and electricity consumption in 
peak times is shifted to other times, this has the impact of flattening the 
demand curve.27 The price of electricity generation is determined in half-hour 
blocks on a bidding process. Fewer periods of peak demand, and therefore 
fewer half-hour periods of very high electricity generation prices in the 
wholesale electricity market (prices can rise to $13,100 per MWh28) will reduce 
the average wholesale electricity price. This would also flow through to 
customers as a reduced electricity generation component in electricity tariffs. 
Figure 3: Network capital expenditure 2010 -2014 ($ 2010) 
 
Source: ISF, Australian Decentralised Energy Roadmap, 2011.  
Figure 4: Total benefit of demand reduction in the NEM 2013/14 to 2022/23 
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THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPERATIVE THE TECHNOLOGICAL IMPERATIVE 
The impacts of climate change will be dramatic if global carbon 
emissions do not peak by 2020.29 This makes the need to shift to 
cleaner energy options even more urgent. The response required 
to address climate change will need to go beyond the 
incremental, piecemeal approach adopted so far. 
In May 2013, carbon dioxide levels of 400 parts per million (ppm) were recorded 
for the first time. There is scientific agreement that global emissions need to 
remain below 450 ppm if we are to have a 50% chance of avoiding a more than 2 
degrees global average temperature rise. Baseline projections for business-as-
usual puts carbon concentrations at 685ppm by 2050, placing the world in danger 
of average global temperature rises of between 3 to 6 degrees by 2100.30  
We are already seeing the impacts of this elevated level of greenhouse gases in 
the form of increased temperatures, impacts on rainfall, extreme weather, sea 
level rise and health impacts. The Climate Commission notes that Australia is one 
of the most vulnerable developed countries to climate change.31  
To avert the most severe projected impacts of 
climate change, global emissions need to reduce 
rapidly to near zero by 2050 and emission levels 
need to peak by 2020. This makes the current 
decade a critical period for emissions reduction.  
Australia has one of the most carbon intensive 
economies in the world, and the continued supply 
side focus to electricity has exacerbated this, with 
the electricity sector accounting for 35% of 
Australia’s national greenhouse gas emissions.32  Energy-related carbon 
emissions in Australia are 18 tonnes per capita, well above the OECD average of 
10.6 tonnes per capita. To deliver its share of global emission reductions, 
Australia will need to decarbonise its electricity systems rapidly.  
Increasing our energy efficiency, by using less energy and reducing peak demand 
is one of the lowest cost forms of carbon abatement.  And using DM to support 
energy efficiency while avoiding energy infrastructure costs is one of the most 
cost effective ways of delivering energy efficiency.  
The electricity sector is at a turning point: disruptive technological 
change including the widespread adoption of solar panels 
(photovoltaics), improved energy efficiency of appliances and 
buildings and, soon, electric vehicles (EVs) and energy storage is 
fundamentally changing our requirements of electricity networks.  
Australia’s current electricity system developed as a centralised system consisting 
of a limited number of large-scale electricity generators and a network to take 
electricity supply from the small number of generators to customers. The business 
model involves providing 'kilowatt-hours' to consumers, with charges mostly based 
on the total volume of electricity used. This total volume and therefore total 
revenues have generally increased annually. At the same time, peak demand has 
also increased, which has increased the amount of network required.  
This situation is changing rapidly. The volume of electricity generated by large coal 
fired power stations and flowing through the main grid has steadily declined since 
2007, while the amount of distributed generation has also increased, particularly in 
the form of solar panels. The AEMO estimates that the jump in solar power in 2012 
(from 1.5 to 2.7TWh) accounted for 
about 1/3 of the reduced output from 
the NEM.33 
The ability of consumers to generate 
electricity from the sun, combined with 
the ability to store their electricity for 
later use (e.g. through batteries and EVs) 
may soon provide a viable alternative to 
our current centralised supply system.  
These changes in supply, combined with demand-side technologies such as more 
efficient appliances and buildings and energy management technologies, have led 
to a fall in overall demand and energy sales for centralised energy utilities. The 
continued adoption of decentralised electricity solutions will require major changes 
to the business models of Australia electricity suppliers. Encouraging DNSPs to 
develop and support network DM as a business opportunity is crucial to managing 
this transition.  
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3 
STATUS: DM AND THE NATIONAL ELECTRICITY MARKET 
DM is intended to be used in the National Electricity Market where it is the most efficient way of providing 
electricity services to consumers. However, the actual amount of DM in the National Electricity Market is 
relatively low, due to a variety of barriers. Despite several attempts to deal with this problem, current 
responses to the low uptake of DM do not effectively address these barriers. 
THE INTENT AND OPERATION OF ELECTRICITY LEGISLATION AND REGULATION 
All activities undertaken by DNSPs are governed by the legislation and 
regulations that control the National Electricity Market (NEM). The legislation, 
overseen by the Australian Energy Market Commission (AEMC), and the 
economic regulation instigated by the Australian Energy Regulator (AER) operate 
at various levels, and incorporate both the original intent and the actual 
operation of the rules in relation to demand management.  
At the highest level, the National Electricity Law (NEL) and the National 
Electricity Rules (NER) guide the whole National Electricity Market. Underneath 
the Rules, sits the economic regulatory framework that controls the supply- and 
demand-side activities of the DNSPs. The framework includes one specific 
provision for an incentive scheme for demand management. The intent and 






The National Electricity Objective places the long-term interests of 
consumers at the heart of the operation of the National Electricity 
Market, but is silent on the role of demand management in 
achieving this. 
The NEL and NER govern the way the Australian electricity market operates. The 
NEL sets out the National Electricity Objective (NEO) as follows: 
The objective of this Law is to promote efficient investment in, and efficient 
operation and use of, electricity services for the long term interests of 
consumers of electricity with respect to— 
(a) price, quality, safety, reliability and security of supply of electricity; and 
(b) the reliability, safety and security of the national electricity system. 
Energy market institutions such as the AEMC, the AER and the AEMO are required 
to take account of the NEO in the exercise of their various powers. 
Missing from the criteria important to consumers’ long-term interests are 
environmental performance and the protection of vulnerable consumers and the 
two key means to meet these missing criteria: energy efficiency and demand 
management.34  The focus on electricity price rather than electricity bills has also  
obstructed an balanced consideration of DM.  
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Current economic regulation of the NEM intends for DM to be 
used wherever it is the least-cost option. However, in practice 
the regulatory framework hinders DNSPs from retaining avoided 
or deferred capital expenditure savings from DM activities, 
leading to a preference for network investment. 
The intent of current economic regulation is for DNSPs to use the most efficient 
means of servicing electricity demand, regardless of whether it is a supply- or 
demand-side solution. 
However the AEMC, in its recent ‘Power of Choice’ review, found that the 
current regulatory arrangements may be discouraging DNSPs from pursuing 
economically efficient DM projects, resulting in a preference for network capital 
investment. The review stated that some of the factors contributing to this 
preference for capital investment include: 
 the regulatory frameworks for assessing and approving operating 
expenditure (opex) and capital expenditure (capex) 
 differing financial returns of opex and capex 
 the ways in which allowed costs are recovered through tariff structures.35 
Specifically, current regulations treat DM projects differently, depending on 
whether or not they are included in a DNSP’s regulatory proposal for a 
regulatory control period. If a DNSP proposes a DM option in its regulatory 
proposal (as capital or operating expenditure) it is able to recover the costs of 
implementing the DM option, but not any capital expenditures that might be 
avoided (e.g. network augmentation expenditure).  
If, however, the DM option was not included in the regulatory proposal, but was 
identified during the regulatory control period, then the direct implementation costs 
are not recoverable, but any savings from successful deferral or avoidance of capex 
are retained by the NSP until the end of the control period. Additionally, any 
deferred or avoided opex is retained for a period of five years under the Efficiency 
Benefit Sharing Scheme (EBSS). However, while DM costs might be incurred in this 
regulatory period, it is expected that deferred capital expenditure would occur in 
subsequent regulatory periods. Therefore, DNSPs are not currently likely to be able 
to retain the majority of any capital expenditure savings resulting from DM. 
The current DM Incentive Scheme is comprised of an 
innovation allowance plus the potential recovery of foregone 
revenue. It is designed to supplement, rather than provide a 
source of funding for, DM projects. 
The AER currently has two jurisdictional demand management incentive schemes 
(DMIS) operating in the 2009–2014 regulatory control period (Vic, QLD/SA and 
NSW/ACT). The current DMIS mainly comprises the Demand Management 
Innovation Allowance (DMIA), and in NSW, continuing the D-factor scheme 
developed by the Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal of NSW (IPART). 
The current DMIS is therefore essentially a small innovation allowance. 
Demand Management Innovation Allowance (all jurisdictions) 
The DMIA consists of two parts: a) an annual ex-ante allowance in the form of a 
fixed amount of additional revenue and b) a foregone revenue recovery 
mechanism to balance any reduction in the quantity of energy sold that is directly 
attributable to non-tariff DMIA projects. 
The DMIA for VIC/QLD/SA DNSPs makes explicit that it aims to complement the 
broader regulatory framework, and is not designed to be the sole, or even 
primary, source of funding for demand management expenditure. Instead, the 
DMIA is designed to supplement a DNSP’s approved capital and operating 
expenditure in a regulatory control period. 
D-Factor (NSW only) 
The D-Factor (‘D’ for demand management) was introduced by the 
Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal of NSW (IPART – the NSW 
economic regulator) in 2004 in order ‘to ensure that these regulatory barriers 
[to DM] are removed’.36 
The D-Factor operates by allowing DNSPs to increase their prices slightly to 
recover any loss of revenue arising from lower energy sales, as a result of 
DNSPs undertaking DM measures. The D-factor also allows the DNSPs to 
recover the direct cost of undertaking DM measures, provided this does not 
exceed the value of savings in network costs due to the measures. 
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THE ACTUAL PERFORMANCE OF DM IN THE NEM 
Only a very low proportion of peak demand is currently met through demand management in Australia. 
Despite a lack of comprehensive national reporting on demand 
management, there is evidence that there has been some recent 
progress by network businesses in relation to DM, although this has 
mainly been confined to Queensland. 
The latest available figures, from the 2011 Survey of Electricity Network 
Demand Management in Australia37, identify just over 350MW of 
demand reduction from network DM projects in Australia in 2010/11. 
This was a substantial increase on 2009/10 figures (126MW), but still 
small in an electricity system that has more than 45,000 MW of 
generation capacity. 
However, electricity distributors are not the only source of demand 
management within the electricity system. Electricity retailers also 
instigate demand management activities, while state government 
energy efficiency schemes also contribute to reducing peak demand. 
The estimated peak savings achieved by retailers’ activities and 
schemes in 2010/11 were about 350MW – approximately equal to that 
achieved by networks.38 
However, the total value of network and non-network DM activities 
currently only equates to about 2% of total peak demand, as shown in 
Figure 5. Whilst an increase on previous years, this is still somewhat 
lower than performance in the US, where demand management meets 
4.3% of total peak demand.  
(In addition to these estimates, there is a significant volume of DM in 
the form of residential off peak electric storage water heaters that 
operate in the low demand period overnight instead of peak demand 
periods. However, it is debatable how much this technology 
contributed in practice to reduced electricity peak demand. In the 
absence of off peak electric water heaters much of this load would 
likely have shifted to gas water heating, which would also not 
contribute to peak electricity demand.) 
Figure 5: Peak demand reduction compared to total peak demand 
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The current Demand Management Incentive Allowance provides very limited financial incentive, and has a low uptake. 
The Demand Management Innovation Allowance is quite 
limited in scope, currently providing between $100,000 
and $1 million for each network for DM each year for five 
years, as shown in Figure 6 to the right.  
The Productivity Commission believes that unless other 
market changes result in a substantial increase in 
commercially viable demand management, the 
innovation allowance needs to be increased.39 
The most recent AER report on DMIA expenditures states 
that non-Victorian DNSPs claimed $2.2 million in DMIA 
expenditures in 2011–12, just over twice the amount in 
2010–11, while Victorian DNSPs claimed $5.6 million in 
2012, approximately equal to the amount claimed in 
2011.40 
However, despite this increase, approved DMIA 
expenditure from 2009–10 to 2011–12 accounts for just 
14% of the total allowance available to the non-Victorian 
DNSPs in their current regulatory control periods, and 
11% for Victorian DNSPs, equalling approximately 13% of 
the total $36.5 million available across the NEM. This 
demonstrates that even where money is actually 
allocated specifically for the purpose, there has often 
been a low uptake of it by DNSPs.  This suggests that an 
effective DM Incentive Scheme needs to go beyond 
simply making a small monetary allowance for DM.   An 
effective DMIS is likely to require other elements such as 
targets, comprehensive reporting, clear accountability 
and significant incentives as proposed in this report. 
Figure 6: Demand Management Innovation Allowance: allocation and expenditure 
 
Source: AEMC Power of Choice Review Final Report, 2012 
 
  

























































































ACT NSW QLD SA VIC TAS
2009-14 2010-15 2011-15 2012-16
DMIA spent to 2011/12 DMIA allocated over 5yr period Proportion of DMIA spent
$5m $5m $5m 
$3m $3m 
$.5m 
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BARRIERS TO DM 
The disparity between the intent of the above legislation and regulation for DM in the NEM on the one hand and networks’ actual 
performance on the other can be attributed to a number of barriers to the uptake of efficient DM, including regulatory issues, cultural 
bias, imperfect information, split incentives, payback gaps, inefficient pricing and confusion. 
There are many barriers to the increase of efficient DM in the NEM. These can 
be classified into seven categories of barriers, as shown in Figure 7. Within each 
of these categories are specific problems relating to the use of DM by DNSPs, as 




A more detailed discussion of barriers to DM is available in: 
 Dunstan, et al, Institutional Barriers to Intelligent Grid41 
 Dunstan, et al, Barriers to demand management: A survey of stakeholder 
perceptions.42 
Figure 7: Categories of barriers to demand management 
The biasing of regulation against 
distributed energy resources 
Insufficient attention given by 
individuals and organisations to  
energy use 
Lack of access to relevant 
information 
Benefits spread across numerous 
stakeholders 
Gap in acceptable payback 
periods between energy 
consumers and suppliers 
Failure to reflect costs (including 
environmental costs) properly in 
energy prices 
Additional barriers created by the 
interplay of the other six types of 
barriers 
 
Table 1: Specific barriers facing DNSPs in the implementation of DM 
Barrier category Specific problem 
Regulatory 
barriers 
Lack of overarching policy imperative 
Bias towards network augmentation over DM 
Higher reliability criteria neglecting DM 
Lack of appropriate incentives for DM 
Cultural bias 
Favouring of supply-side solutions 
Lack of experience and confidence in DM 
Imperfect 
information 
Lack of comprehensive reporting of network DM 
Split incentives Disaggregated supply chain spreads costs/benefits unevenly 
Payback gap 
DNSPs able to recover network capital expenditure over say 40 
years but unable to recover expenditure in customer energy 
savings that would pay back in 2 or 3 years 
Inefficient 
pricing 
Price structures that don’t reflect cost structures 
Confusion 
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Regulatory barriers 
Lack of overarching policy imperative: National Electricity Objective  
Previous research by ISF43 found that the National Electricity Objective (NEO) 
does not contain a broad enough range of criteria to meet the ‘long-term 
interests of consumers’. In a survey of stakeholder perceptions of barriers to 
demand management, there was strong agreement that the lack of a 
DM/environmental objective in the National Electricity Law was a barrier to the 
uptake of DM. 44 
Bias towards network augmentation: Economic regulation 
The current economic regulatory regime hinders DNSPs from retaining avoided 
or deferred capex savings from demand management activities, which 
encourages DNSPs to invest in network augmentation instead of DM. At the 
same time, capital expenditure is strongly rewarded through a high weighted 
average cost of capital (WACC) 45. 
Further, the use of price caps rather than revenue caps in some jurisdictions can 
encourage DNSPs in these areas to favour network investment over DM, leading 
to high network costs. Price caps also encourage DNSPs to ‘over-recover’ 
revenue, which can indirectly give DNSPs an incentive to overinvest in their 
networks.46 At the same time, they create strong disincentives for DM, as 
reduced demand and consumption reduces a DNSP’s revenue.  
On the other hand, a revenue cap means a DNSP cannot earn extra revenue 
simply by selling additional electricity. Instead, revenue caps encourage DNSPs to 
reduce costs in order to maximise the profit from their allowed revenue, thereby 
incentivising DM wherever it is a lower cost option than network investment. 
Lack of appropriate incentives: DM Incentive Scheme 
During the preliminary work conducted by AER last year in agreeing to an 
incentive scheme for NSW DNSPs, stakeholders noted a number of problems 
with the scheme, including: ‘the current scheme failed to create sufficient 
incentives for long-term structural change’; ‘the lack of funding provided under 
the DMIA reduced its effectiveness’ and ‘demand side actions and technologies 
should be incentivised based on the actual reduction in electricity demand 
(particularly peak demand) it brings’.47 
High risk/penalty for failure: Higher reliability criteria 
Regulatory requirements for reliability standards encourage DNSPs to plan, 
maintain and operate their networks to minimise power outages. High reliability 
criteria can drive network investment and augmentation and encourage 
redundancy in the network.48 NSW and QLD have recently raised the reliability 
standards that electricity networks must meet as part of their network license 
conditions, and include deterministic criteria. Increasing reliability by even a small 
margin in an already reliable electricity system such those which supply most 
parts of Australia is quite expensive, and this drives network charges higher.  
In addition, penalties apply in all jurisdictions if DNSPs fail to meet reliability 
targets. This can increase DNSPs’ actual or perceived risks associated with using 
DM to defer network augmentation in cases where the DM might affect 
reliability. This is more likely to occur if the DNSP lacks experience or confidence. 
Cultural bias 
Favouring of supply side solutions 
The current culture of DNSPs generally favours centralised, supply side solutions 
rather than DM. In response to regulatory incentives, the business structure of 
NSPs is built around capital expenditure. This means that not only are the reward 
and incentive structures for key decision-makers geared to network 
augmentation solutions, but so are the ‘shared knowledge’, ‘common sense’ and 
conventions of these decision-makers. This impedes the ability of DNSPs’ 
planning processes and procedures to generate network DM solutions.49  
However, this culture can change.  For example, anecdotal evidence suggests that 
the internal business culture within Queensland DNSPs shifted significantly in 
recent years towards a more balanced approach to DM as regulatory and policy 
barriers to network DM were removed.  
Limited experience and confidence in DM 
This supply-side culture has led to a lack of experience and expertise in DM, and 
an associated lack of confidence in DM options. DNSPs therefore often attribute a 
high risk that DM will not deliver on the performance criteria they require. When 
this is coupled with limited data on successful DM solutions, the analysis of DM 
generally receives such an adverse risk-weighting that they are rarely assessed as 
preferred to network augmentation. This is exacerbated in jurisdictions with 
deterministic reliability criteria, as discussed above.  
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Imperfect information 
Lack of comprehensive reporting of network DM 
At present, there is no comprehensive system for measuring and reporting 
network DM. The only comprehensive assessment of electricity network DM to 
date was the 2011 Survey of Electricity Network Demand Management in 
Australia.50 
DNSPs are required to report annually on the outcomes of DM activities 
undertaken through the Demand Management Innovation Allowance, but as 
shown earlier, this is a very small amount of DM. 
Split incentives 
Disaggregated supply chain spreads costs/benefits unevenly 
The electricity market in Australia has four main components: generation, 
transmission, distribution and retail (described as the ‘supply chain’), shown in 
Figure 8. These different components are generally compartmentalised, and 
are usually owned by different companies. 
As the costs and benefits of DM are felt differently at different stages of the 
supply chain, they are therefore spread unevenly amongst the different 
stakeholders. This can mean that stakeholders who implement DM options, 
and therefore accrue the costs, can have trouble capturing the benefits, while 
other stakeholders will receive benefits without contributing to the costs. 
Figure 8: Elements in the electricity supply chain 
 
Source: Adapted from The Energy Supply Chain, Energy Efficiency Exchange (eex.gov.au) 
Inefficient pricing 
Price structures that do not  reflect cost structures 
The cost of electricity supply varies dramatically from time to time and place 
to place depending on the capacity of the infrastructure at particular times 
and places.  An increase in the use of electricity at peak time in a constrained 
part of the network can increase costs dramatically if it necessitates 
augmenting infrastructure, while use at other times or in other 
unconstrained locations may impose little if any additional cost. 
However, these varying cost structures are generally not reflected in current 
price structures. Instead, network tariffs are generally based around a relatively 
small, fixed daily charge and a usage charge based on total volume of electricity 
used (usually a ‘flat’ tariff at a set cents-per-kilowatt-hour price, or a time-of-use 
tariff with a number of ‘stepped’ prices as shown in Figure 9). This means that the 
total ‘cost’ of electricity supply is ‘smeared’ across all users through the creation 
of an average ‘price’ for a tariff which is given to everyone, everywhere. As 
current tariffs are generally not cost reflective, there is little price incentive to 
consumers to act in ways that reduce the total costs of supply. 
Figure 9: Price verse cost of electricity supply 
 
  
Generation Transmission Distribution Retail 
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CURRENT RESPONSES TO IDENTIFIED PROBLEMS 
Because of the sharp rise in electricity prices over the last five years, more attention has recently been paid to barriers to DM and 
several reform processes are under way. However, these do not comprehensively address all the key barriers to demand management. 
Following the public outcry over sharply increasing electricity bills, 2011 saw the beginning of a number of a targeted national efforts aimed at addressing some of the issues 
in the electricity market that were putting upward pressure on household bills. For example, the Council of Australian Governments’ (COAG’s) Standing Council on Energy 
and Resources (SCER) established an Energy Market Reform Working Group (EMRWG) and the AEMC initiated its Power of Choice Review.  The Productivity Commission 
Review of Electricity Network Regulatory Frameworks was particularly critical of current regulatory practice.51  
Table 2 outlines the various recent or existing reform processes and the specific problems that they attempt to address (more detail on these various responses is provided 
in the following pages). As can be seen, not all of the specific problems and general barriers will be addressed by these reforms, and in some cases, the reforms only partly or 
ineffectively address the problem. 
Table 2: Current responses to the barriers inhibiting demand management 
  
Barrier type Specific problem Current response 
Regulatory 
barriers 
Lack of overarching policy imperative n/a 
Bias towards network augmentation over DM 
AER Better Regulation Expenditure Incentives workstream 
AER Rate of Return & Expenditure Forecast Assessment workstreams 
Higher reliability criteria 
COAG/SCER commitment to new national framework for best-practice 
reliability standards 
Lack of appropriate incentives for DM 
AEMC Power of Choice recommendation for reform of the DMEGCIS and AER 
Better Regulation Power of Choice workstream  
Cultural bias 
Favouring of supply-side solutions n/a 




Lack of comprehensive reporting of network DM Network Expansion Framework (limited reporting) 
Disaggregated supply chain spreads costs/benefits unevenly AEMC Power of Choice proposed reform of the DMEGCIS 
Payback gap 
DNSPs able to recover network capital expenditure over say 
40 years but unable to recover expenditure in customer 
energy savings that would pay back in 2 or 3 years 
AEMC Power of Choice proposed reform of the DMEGCIS 
Inefficient 
pricing 
Price structures that do not reflect cost structures 
AEMC Power of Choice recommendation for pricing principles to guide network 
tariff structures 
SCER/IPART Distribution Network Pricing Arrangements rule change request 
Confusion 
Complex interaction of the above barriers obstructing 
effective reform  
Numerous reviews but practical outcomes yet to be seen 
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AEMC ‘Power of Choice’ review  
The AEMC’s ‘Power of Choice’ review (Mar 2011 to Nov 2012) 
analysed reform options for the National Electricity Market to 
help consumers better manage their energy use, and to 
encourage electricity companies to better facilitate consumer 
choice and invest more efficiently. It was the third stage in a 
review of DM, which it referred to as demand side participation 
(DSP). 
The final report of the Review proposed a number of reforms. The two reforms 
of particular relevance to DM are: 
 provide networks with an allowance for revenue foregone as a result of 
undertaking DM activities instead of traditional capex projects 
 develop a set of pricing principles to guide network tariff structures. 
In addition, the report recommended changes to the current demand 
management and embedded generation connection incentive scheme 
(DMEGCIS) to provide an appropriate return on DM projects that deliver a net 
cost saving to consumers, and a minor change to the NER which makes it clear 
that AER can consider non-network market benefits when assessing efficiency of 
expenditure. 52 
COAG and SCER energy market reform 
The Council of Australian Governments’ (COAG’s) 
Standing Council on Energy and Resources (SCER) 
is responsible for pursuing priority issues of 
national significance in the energy and resources 
sectors, and for progressing key reform elements of the former Ministerial 
Council on Energy and the Ministerial Council on Mineral and Petroleum 
Resources. 
SCER established an Energy Market Reform Working Group (EMRWG) to identify, 
consider and respond to priorities for energy market development, particularly 
focusing on some of SCER's Priority Issues of National Significance.53 
 
In December 2012, COAG endorsed a package of national energy market reforms 
developed collaboratively by SCER to respond to the current challenges of rising 
electricity prices.54 
The main element of the reform package relevant to demand side participation is 
around actions to reduce electricity peaks, specifically: 
Agreement to provide for greater demand-side participation to make it easier 
for consumers to reduce demand, particularly at peak periods, to minimise the 
need for new investment in energy infrastructure – drawing on the AEMC’s 
Power of Choice review. 55 
In addition, the package includes elements around rule changes to limit over-
investment in networks, including: 
Commitment in-principle to a new national framework of best-practice 
reliability standards which give added weight to the interests of consumers 
and in-principle agreement to transfer reliability setting to the Australian 
Energy Regulator; 
Early implementation of new rules that will ensure investment by network 
businesses is more efficient; and 
A public consultation process to improve the Limited Merits Review Regime to 
minimise the risk of ‘cherry-picking’ by network businesses while also ensuring 
review arrangements provide an effective back-stop for business.56 
As part of this reform package, SCER asked the Australian Energy Market 
Operator (AEMO) to begin work to develop a new option for demand side 
resources to participate in the wholesale market for electricity, and to develop a 
new category of market participants for non-energy service provision.57 SCER also 
agreed to task the AEMC with investigating the implications of differences 
between actual and forecast demand within the operation of the network 
regulatory frameworks by May 2013, and to task AEMO to develop demand 
forecasts which could be used by the AER to inform its future regulatory 
determination processes.58 
In January 2013, SCER agreed ‘in principle’ to submit a rule change request to 
amend the demand management incentive scheme, but has not yet done so. 
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Distribution Network Expansion Framework 
The AEMC recently made a Rule establishing a national framework for electricity 
distribution network planning and expansion, including new demand side 
obligations for distribution businesses.59  
The new Rule was an effort to address information barriers to demand-side 
responses. When information about the need for, and nature of, network 
investment is not provided in a timely and accurate way, it is more difficult for 
demand-side alternatives to be developed. DM service providers need sufficient 
time to consider the identified need, determine if DM can address the identified 
need, and determine the costs and benefits of participation. 
This rule requires DNSPs to have greater regard to DM potential, and to publish 
more information to help potential DM providers to identify DSP opportunities 
and understand their value and operating requirements. Businesses will also be 
required to engage more with DM service providers. The rule consists of two 
new arrangements: 1) an annual planning and reporting process, and 2) a 
distribution project assessment process, both of which commenced on 1 January 
2013.  
The AEMC notes that the impact of the Rules will depend on the extent to which 
customers and DM service providers find the information useful. There is a 
possibility that the information provided may not be comprehensive enough to 
allow demand-side participants to understand the nature of the network 
problems that need to be addressed. Further, DM participants may not be 
provided with sufficient time to propose legitimate alternatives. Both of these 
scenarios would reduce the utility of the new requirements.60 
AER Better Regulation program 
The AER implemented the Better Regulation program of 
work to ‘deliver an improved regulatory framework 
focused on promoting the long-term interests of 
electricity consumers’.61 The program has a series of 
workstreams to cover such things as assessment of 
expenditure proposals, calculation of allowed return on 
assets, allocation of costs and engaging with consumers. 
The purpose of the Power of Choice workstream is ‘ensuring network companies 
are innovating and exploring demand management solutions’. The workstream 
will explore how best to adapt AER regulatory processes to make a positive 
contribution to increasing demand management.  
The workstream has three components: 
1. Network incentives, including the Demand Management and Embedded 
Generation Connection Incentive Scheme (DMEGCIS) – arising from Power of 
Choice. 
2. Regulatory investment test for distribution (RIT-D) – arising from the 
network planning and expansion framework rule determination. 
3. Efficient and flexible network pricing – arising from Power of Choice. 
The first two of these components are dependent on rule change requests not 
yet submitted to the AEMC, so the initial focus of the workstream will be on 
contributing to the AEMC rule change processes when they begin.  
In addition to the work being undertaken under the Power of Choice workstream, 
another AER workstream is also developing expenditure incentive and rate-of-
return guidelines (as required by the revised National Electricity Rules). This 
workstream is reviewing existing incentives for efficient capex. Part of the review 
is to move towards neutrality between capex and opex incentives.62 
These four elements are discussed in detail in Appendix D. 
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HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF ACTION TO SUPPORT DM 
Current responses to the barriers inhibiting demand management should be considered in the historical context of over two decades of 
attempts to increase the use of demand management in Australia. 
The chronic neglect by the electricity supply industry of DM as a lower cost and 
more environmentally benign strategy, has been a significant feature of public 
discourse in Australian at least since the Victorian Parliamentary Inquiry into 
‘Electricity Supply and Demand beyond the mid-1990s’ in 1987–88.  
Despite two-and-a-half decades of debate, and tens of billions of dollars invested 
in power stations and electricity networks, demand management remains 
marginalised in Australia.63 If the current round of reform to support DM is to 
succeed where previous attempts have failed, it is important for policy makers 





Timeline of efforts to address electricity DM in Australia 
1985:  Based on Inquiry into Electricity Generation Planning (McDonnell 
Enquiry), NSW Government responds to over-building of power 
stations with strategic planning approach including DM. 
1987:  Victorian Parliament Inquiry into high bills and poor reliability results 
in Utility DM Action Plan from 1990 to 1994 
1992:  National Grid Protocol includes environment as a key component and 
equal treatment of supply- and demand-side resources (demand 
management/energy efficiency) 
1995:  NSW Government reform of electricity market results in Sustainable 
Energy Development Authority to promote energy efficiency and 
renewable energy. DM included as NSW regulatory objective in 
Electricity Supply Act and IPART Act  
1998  Environment and DM marginalised from National Electricity Code 
(replacing 1992 National Grid Protocol). 
2002  NSW IPART Inquiry into DM recommends Demand Management 
Fund.   Introduction of D-factor. 
2005  National Electricity Law (replacing 1998 National Electricity Code) 
fails to incorporate environment energy efficiency or DM in National 
Electricity Objective. 
2005   NSW Demand Management Fund established as Energy Savings Fund. 
2007  NSW Energy Savings Fund subsumed into Climate Change Fund. 
2011  Queensland Energy Conservation and Demand Management Plan 
establishes targets for network businesses Ergon and Energex 
2012  AEMC ‘Power of Choice’ report recommends establishment of new 
DM Incentive Scheme 
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4 
OPPORTUNITIES: POLICY SOLUTIONS TO FACILITATE DM  
The benefits of Network DM and barriers to efficient DM are now better understood in Australia than ever 
before. Moreover, the available policy solutions to overcome these barriers now relatively clear. This 
section outlines the key policy measures required to facilitate cost-effective electricity network DM.  
POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
There are some positive reforms to support DM occurring in response the 
recent array of inquiries into the electricity market. However, most of these 
reforms are still not fully implemented, and there are also some key gaps 
which need to be addressed. 
The previous section divided barriers to efficient DM into seven categories. 
Similarly, the policy tools available to address these barriers can be divided 
into seven categories, as illustrated in Figure 10 to the right. 
While each policy tool loosely corresponds to a particular barrier, it is 
important to note that a given policy tool is not always the best response to 
its corresponding barrier. For example, while in some cases regulatory 
reform may be the best response to regulatory barriers, in other 
circumstances incentives or information provision may be a more effective 
response. Therefore, a degree of informed judgement is required to most 
effectively apply these tools. 
The need for such strategic judgment is illustrated in the ‘policy palette’ in 
Figure 10.  This figure categorises 20 possible policy tools that could be used 
to address barriers to DM and how they relate to each other.  While this is 
not an exhaustive list of policy options, even 20 is too many policy tools to 
pursue at once.  
 
 
Figure 10: Barriers and possible policy solutions 
Reform regulation to remove 
perverse incentive and to 
encourage efficient behaviour  
Establishing performance targets 
and measuring and reporting 
performance against them 
Providing accessible, timely, 
relevant information 
Making it easier for customer and 
suppliers to coordinate and 
capture benefits 
Offering financial and other 
rewards for desired behaviour 
More accurately reflecting costs 
(including environmental costs) in 
energy prices 
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PROPOSED REFORMS 
The seven categories of tools in the policy palette address the seven types of 
institutional barriers described above.  Applying a suite of policy tools 
targeted at the specific barriers is likely to be more effective than a single 
policy tool.64 
The key reforms required to stimulate an economically efficient level of 
network DM  include: 
a) Decoupling network business profits from electricity sales: Reform 
economic regulations which financially penalise network businesses that 
reduce their electricity sales volume by supporting DM. 
b) Setting annual targets for DM: DNSPs to work collaboratively with 
regulators to nominate performance targets for DM. These targets 
would provide a basis for paying performance incentives to DNSPs. 
c) DNSPs establishing plans for DM: DNSPs to develop DM plans for each 
regulatory control period that include options to meet or exceed their 
proposed DM targets. These plans would feed into and would be 
adjusted according to the DNSPs annual planning process. The plans 
would complement the DM Engagement Strategy produced under the 
Network Planning and Expansion Rule by outlining the specific DM 
options and projects are being considered and developed. Such plans 
would also assist in the RIT D process.   The plans would form the 
basis of budget allocations included in DNSPS’ regulatory proposals. 
d) DNSPs making specific budget allocations for DM: DNSPs to include 
specific budget allocations for undertaking efficient DM in their 
regulatory proposals. This budget allocation should also include 
proposals to use the Demand Management Innovation Allowance but 
exclude the DM Performance Allowance. 
e) DM Performance reporting: DNSPs to produce comprehensive annual 
reports on their DM activities and outcomes. The reporting should 
include: actual versus forecast peak demand and energy consumption, 
DM performance, savings, and revenue/price impact. 
 
The key reforms target 6 of the 20 Policy Tools for Developing Distributed Energy: 
1) DM Coordination Agency 
2) Decouple electricity sales from 
network profits 
3) Reform National Electricity Rules  
4) Streamline DG Licensing 
5) Extend retailer EE targets 
6) DM targets & reporting 
7) Resource assessments & case 
studies 
8) DM handbook & advisory service 
9) Network planning info  
10) Annual DM review 
11) Energy audits & technical support 
12) Training & skills development 
13) Streamline network negotiation 
process 
14) DM Ombudsman  
15) Public recognition & awards 
16) DM Incentives  
17) Reform feed-in tariffs 
18) Carbon Price  
19) Cost reflective pricing 
20) Network support payments  
 
  
Figure 11: The Policy Palette 
 
Source: ISF, 20 Policy Tools for Developing Distributed Energy, 2009 
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f) Incentives for good DM performance: The AER to 
provide a DM performance allowance to DNSPs as an 
incentive to undertake efficient DM. This performance 
allowance is offered in recognition of existing 
regulatory and non-regulatory barriers to DM, and to 
return a share of the non-network market benefits of 
DM to DNSPs.  
The performance allowance should be based on 
achieving or exceeding a specified threshold of the 
nominated DM targets. The proposed formula for the 
DM performance allowance is set out above in Section 
1: Proposals, while a worked example is provided in 
Appendix C. 
An example of how a performance allowance might 
work, assuming a minimum performance threshold of 
80% of target and a performance cap of 150% of target, 
is shown in Table 3 to the right. 
No penalty is proposed to be applied for failure to meet 
the performance threshold.  
g) Fair treatment of DM in National Electricity Rules 
including changing the National Electricity Rules to 
require and allow DM options to be implemented 
wherever they are cheaper than network 
augmentation. This includes: 
 allowing the benefits of avoided network 
investment to be rolled over from one regulatory 
period to the next, just as returns on investment in 
network infrastructure can be rolled over from one 
period to the next 
 opex/capex offset to allow DNSPs to recover 
increased operating expenditure on DM where this 




Table 3: Calculation of performance incentive 
Size of incentive payment ($m) relative to target and actual performance (MW or MVa) 
 
Based on a table prepared by Matthew Serpell, CitiPower/ Powercor  
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h) DM Innovation Allowance: provided to support more uncertain, 
innovative DM, to increase the amount of commercially viable DM 
options in the market. The Productivity Commission believes that the 
innovation allowance should be increased from its current low level.65 
i) Better information on network constraints and avoidable costs 
including easily accessible, standardised, up-to-date and relevant 
demand and network planning information to assist customers and DM 
service providers to anticipate, understand and respond to network DM 
opportunities. 
As reforms are implemented, it is hoped that they will result in both a 
levelling of the regulatory playing field between network augmentation 
and DM, and a substantial increase in the amount of commercially viable 
DM options available in the market. If this occurs, the provision of an 
innovation allowance and performance incentives may become 
unnecessary. However some barriers, such as split incentives/ non-
network market benefits may remain well into the future. Other 
elements set out above, such as plans, budget allocation and reporting 
will always remain important. 
 
 
STATUS OF NETWORK DM POLICY SOLUTIONS  
The current status of policy tools in relation to network DM is summarised in Table 4. 
There are significant differences in how the various tools are designed and applied in 
each state and territory.  
However, there are some very useful precedents to be drawn on. In particular, it can be 
seen that Queensland currently has the most comprehensive policy support for network 
































Rev Cap        
D factor   na    na  
Targets        
Plans        
Budget allocation        
Performance Reporting        
Performance Incentives        
Rollover (b/w periods)        
Opex/Capex offset        
Innovation Allowance        
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CONCLUSION:  
A DM BREAKTHROUGH FOR CONSUMERS? 
The potential for DM to reduce costs to electricity consumers has been well 
recognised in Australia for over two decades. Despite occasional attempts by 
regulators and policy makers in most states over this period to unlock this potential, 
the adoption of DM remains patchy at best, particularly in relation to network DM. 
This failure to encourage cost-effective DM has been a significant contributor to the 
dramatic increase in electricity prices and bills over the past five years. 
The recent escalation in electricity prices has led to an unprecedented level of 
scrutiny of electricity network investment and renewed recognition of the 
importance of DM. This policy attention provides a unique opportunity to deliver 
reform that finally and effectively addresses the barriers to cost-effective DM. The 
single most important opportunity is to reform the Demand Management Incentive 
Scheme, as proposed by the AEMC. 
This report seeks to provide a practical agenda for achieving this reform as 
summarised in the box opposite. Such reform could: 
 reduce total costs to consumers and networks  
 moderate and lower energy bills  
 reduce carbon emissions  
 assist the economy in the transition to decentralised energy technologies.  
While all five key actions opposite can and should be pursued together as a package, 
the logical first step is to propose a DM rule change to the AEMC. The success of this 
rule change process will be the first and most crucial test of whether DM and its 






FIVE KEY ACTIONS FOR 
CLEANER, MORE AFFORDABLE 
ELECTRICITY  
In summary the key actions that are proposed in this 
report to support network DM are: 
1. Australian Energy Market Commission (AEMC) to 
change the National Electricity Rules to clarify 
that incentives should be available to network 
businesses to overcome actual and perceived 
barriers to network demand management (DM). 
2. Australian Energy Regulator to establish an 
effective DM incentive scheme (DMIS) that 
drives DM wherever it will reduce costs to 
consumers.  
3. Distribution network businesses to set targets 
for DM, in collaboration with regulators.  
4. Ensure transparent DM reporting activities by 
network businesses. 
5. Provide effective DM performance incentives to 
network businesses. 
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A1. EXISTING DM RULE 
The following is an extract of the National Electricity Rules (Version 55), Chapter 6: Economic Regulation of Distribution Services, p.658-659 
6.6.3 Demand management and embedded generation connection incentive scheme 
(a)  The AER, may in accordance with the distribution consultation procedures, develop and publish an incentive scheme or schemes (demand management and embedded 
generation connection incentive scheme) to provide incentives for Distribution Network Services Providers to implement efficient non-network alternatives, or to manage 
the expected demand for standard control services in some other way, or to efficiently connect Embedded Generators. 
(b)  In developing and implementing a demand management and embedded generation connection incentive scheme, the AER must have regard to: 
(1)  the need to ensure that benefits to electricity consumers likely to result from the scheme are sufficient to warrant any reward or penalty under the scheme for 
Distribution Network Service Providers; 
(2)  the effect of a particular control mechanism (i.e. price – as distinct from revenue – regulation) on a Distribution Network Service Provider's incentives to adopt or 
implement efficient non-network alternatives; 
(3)  the extent the Distribution Network Service Provider is able to offer efficient pricing structures; 
(4)  the possible interaction between a demand management and embedded generation connection incentive scheme and other incentive schemes under clauses 6.5.8, 
6.5.8A, 6.6.2 and 6.6.4; 
(5)  the willingness of the customer or end user to pay for increases in costs resulting from implementation of the scheme; and 
(6)  the effect of classification of distribution services, as determined in accordance with clause 6.2.1, on a Distribution Network Service Provider's incentive to adopt or 
implement efficient Embedded Generator connections. 
(c)  The AER may, from time to time and in accordance with the distribution consultation procedures, amend or replace any scheme that is developed and published under this 
clause. 
(d)  [Deleted] 
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A2. EXISTING DM INCENTIVE SCHEME 
The following is a summary of the structure of the Demand Management Incentive Scheme (DMIS), as set out in the AER’s Demand management incentive schemes for the ACT 
and NSW 2009 distribution determinations: Final Decision (2008); Demand Management Incentive Scheme: Energex, Ergon Energy and ETSA Utilities, 2010–15 (2008); and Demand 
Management Incentive Scheme: Jemena, CitiPower, Powercor, SP AusNet and United Energy, 2011–15 (2009). 
Overview 
The current objective of a DMIS is to ‘provide incentives for DNSPs to implement 
efficient non-network alternatives or to manage the expected demand for standard 
control services in some other way’. 
The DMIS for the current regulatory control period is in the form of a demand 
management innovation allowance (DMIA). In addition, in NSW, the DMIA is 
accompanied by a D-Factor. The DMIA consists of two parts: 
Part A: an annual ex-ante allowance in the form of a fixed amount of additional 
revenue.  
Part B: a foregone revenue recovery mechanism to balance any reduction in the 
quantity of energy sold that is directly attributable to non-tariff DMIA projects. 
Demand Management Innovation Allowance (DMIA) 
The DMIA aims to provide incentives for DNSPs to conduct research and investigation 
into innovative techniques for managing demand so that, in the future, demand 
management projects may be increasingly identified as viable alternatives to network 
augmentation. It aims to increase the current stock of knowledge and experience with 
network demand management, to encourage greater consideration of non-network 
alternatives to augmentation in the decision-making processes of DNSPs.  
The DMIA for VIC/QLD/SA DNSPs is explicit about aiming to complement the broader 
regulatory framework, and is not designed to be the sole, or even primary source of 
funding for demand management expenditure in a regulatory control period. Instead, 
the DMIS is designed to supplement a DNSP’s approved capital and operating 
expenditure. 
DMIA Part A - Allowance 
The dollar amounts that the AER will allow ACT and NSW DNSPs to recover under the 
DMIA are broadly proportionate to the relative sizes of the DNSPs’ annual revenues. 
Projects and programs eligible for approval under this scheme must meet all of the 
specified DMIA criteria. 
The allowance commences at the beginning of each regulatory year. In the second 
regulatory year of the subsequent regulatory control period, when results for regulatory 
years one to five of the regulatory control period are known, a single adjustment will be 
made to return the amount of any underspend or unapproved amounts to customers. 
This ensures that the scheme remains neutral in terms of the expenditure profile within 
the period to which it has applied. 
ACT/NSW DNSPs must submit annual public reports on the outcomes and expenditure 
of the DMIA, which will be published by the AER to help enhance industry knowledge of 
demand management. This information will also form the basis of an assessment by the 
AER of compliance with the DMIA criteria, and the DNSP’s entitlement to recover 
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DMIA Part B – Foregone revenue recovery 
Part B allows a DNSP – whose direct control services are subject to a form of control at 
least partially dependent on energy sold (such as a weighted average price cap or 
average revenue cap) – to recover any forgone revenue resulting from a reduction in 
the quantity of electricity sold that is directly attributable to the implementation of a 
non-tariff demand management program approved under part A of the DMIA. This is to 
offset the disincentives associated with sales-volume-related forms of control. 
DNSPs are unable to recover forgone revenue resulting from demand management 
programs funded out of their regulatory allowance, or reductions in revenue resulting 
from government policy changes in relation to demand. 
Where a demand management project results in reductions in revenue that extend 
beyond the end of that project, the DNSP may apply to recover the forgone revenue 
each regulatory year after the end of the project, up until the end of the next regulatory 
control period. 
Approved forgone revenue will be provided to a DNSP in the second regulatory year of 
the subsequent regulatory control period. 
NSW D-Factor 
The NSW D-Factor is identical to that set out by IPART in 2004. The purpose of the D-
factor, as promulgated by IPART, is to reduce regulatory barriers to demand 
management in NSW. In particular, it is designed to overcome the barriers associated 
with the weighted average price cap form of regulation applying in NSW. 
The weighted average price cap control formula includes a D-factor that allows DNSPs 
to recover: 
 approved non-tariff-based demand management implementation costs, up to a 
maximum value equivalent to the expected avoided distribution costs (as 
defined in the determination) 
 approved tariff-based demand management implementation costs 
 approved revenue foregone as a result of non-tariff-based demand 
management activities. 
The D-factor does not allow DNSPs to explicitly recover costs associated with ‘learning 
by doing’ demand management projects (i.e. DNSPs will only be able to recover the 
costs of such projects where they are able to demonstrate that there is an expected 
deferral benefit that exceeds these costs). 
NSW DNSPs must submit a D-factor proposal as part of their regulatory proposals for 
assessment by the AER. The AER will assess these factor proposals against IPART’s D-
factor guidelines which were adopted by the AER. 
Due to the lag in the D-factor mechanism and to ensure the appropriate incentives 
remain for the duration of the regulatory control period 2009–14, relevant expenditures 
undertaken in this period will be recoverable during the regulatory control period 2014–
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B1. AEMC RULE CHANGE PROCESS 
The following is a summary of the AEMC Rule Making Process, set out in full in Division 3 of Part 7 of the National Electricity Law - Procedure for the making of a Rule by the AEMC. 
Guidelines for requesting a rule change 
 Any person (such as an individual, company or Government) may request the 
making of a Rule (need to clarify coalition). 
 A request must be made in writing to the AEMC and contain the information 
prescribed in section 92 of the NEL & the Regulations, including at a minimum: 
− a description of the proposed Rule (in narrative form as distinct from the 
drafted rules) 
− a statement of the nature and scope of each issue(s) concerning the 
existing Rules and an explanation of how the proposed Rule will address 
this issue or issues (Statement of Issue) 
− an explanation of how the proposed Rule would or would be likely to 
contribute to the achievement of the national electricity objective 
− an explanation of the expected benefits and costs of the proposed 
change and the potential impacts of the change on those likely to be 
affected. 
 The request can be lodged online through the AEMC website or in hardcopy. 
 The request must be on the letterhead of the proponent, signed and dated. 
Rule change process 
There are generally four stages to the National Electricity Rules' (Rules) Rule making 
process once a request for a rule change is submitted. 
Stage 1: Initial consideration of a request for the making of a Rule 
The AEMC is only required to ‘initiate’ a Rule change request (i.e. proceed with the 
next steps in the Rule making process in respect of the request) if the AEMC 
considers that: 
 the minimum content requirements described above have been met 
 the request appears not to be misconceived or lacking in substance 
 the subject matter of the request appears to be for or with respect to a matter 
in respect of which the AEMC may make a rule.  
Stage 2: Consultation on a proposed Rule 
The AEMC will commence public consultation on the proposed rule by publishing a notice 
of the request and the draft Rule, along with an invitation for written submissions. The 
closing date for submissions will be at least four weeks from date of the notice. 
The AEMC may (but is not required to) hold a public hearing on the proposed Rule before 
it makes a draft Rule determination.  
Stage 3: Draft Rule determination (may include draft Rule) and further 
consultation 
Generally, within ten weeks after the closing date for submissions on the proposed Rule, 
the AEMC will publish a draft Rule determination, and if relevant, a draft Rule (this may 
be different to the proponent's proposed Rule, if the AEMC believes it is a more 
preferable Rule).  
Included with the determination will be an invitation for written submissions. The closing 
date for submissions will be at least six weeks from date of the notice. 
Any person may request the AEMC to hold a public hearing on the draft Rule 
determination. The request must be in writing within one week from publishing of the 
draft rule determination. 
If the AEMC decides to hold a public hearing on the draft Rule determination, the hearing 
must not be later than 3 weeks after the publishing of the draft rule determination. 
Stage 4: Final Rule determination and if relevant, making of an amending Rule 
Generally, within six weeks after the closing date for submissions on the draft 
determination, the AEMC will publish a final Rule determination. 
If the AEMC, in its final Rule determination, determines to make an amending Rule, it will 
make the amending Rule as soon as practicable after the publication of the final Rule 
determination. 
The commencement date of the amending Rule will be set out in the amending Rule and 
may be the date the AEMC makes the amending Rule or a later date. The AEMC will 
consolidate the amending Rule into a new version of the Rules when the amending Rule 
commences operation. 
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B2. AEMC DRAFT SPECIFICATIONS FOR NETWORK INCENTIVES AND PROPOSED DRAFT RULE 
The following is an extract from the AEMC Power of Choice Draft Rule Change Specifications, (from the Power of Choice Final Report Draft Specifications, p.34-37) showing the 
changes that have been made to arrive at the Proposed Rule set out in Section 1. 
5 Network incentives 
Draft specification for the proposed rule change to reform application of the demand management and connecting embedded generation incentive scheme. 
Objective: The objective of this proposed rule is to To reform the current demand management incentive scheme to provide the possibility of support appropriate incentives for 
distribution network service providers (DNSPs) to pursue efficient DSP demand management (DM) projects. The incentive scheme will be developed with an overarching objective 
and supporting principles. The AER should have sufficient discretion to develop the detailed design of the scheme – which may contain multiple mechanisms – and the flexibility to 
adapt the application of the scheme to the individual circumstances of each distribution business. 
Application: Proposed rule change to replace current clause 6.6.3 
1. Demand Management Incentive Scheme 
 The AER shall publish an incentive scheme or schemes (demand management incentive scheme or DMIS) to provide incentives for DNSPs to implement efficient DSP DM 
options. 
 DM options include ‘DM projects’ which involve the DNSP offering assistance, funding or other incentives (financial or otherwise) to encourage consumers to reduce or shift 
demand, and ‘price-based DM’, which involves changing the structure of network pricing to encourage DM. DM projects may also include a price-based component.  
 The scheme must be applied in a manner consistent with the following objective: ‘to provide an appropriate return to the network businesses for DSP DM projects which 
deliver a net cost saving to their consumers to support efficient demand management by networks’: 
o DSP DM projects are defined as any conscious use by the DNSP of non-network solutions including demand response, energy efficiency or embedded or distributed 
generation to reduce load at risk, improve reliability or defer the expenditure of capital to augment on the network. 
o Efficient DSP DM is defined for the purposes of the incentive scheme as any DSP DM project that delivers a net benefit to consumers as a whole, regardless of where 
in the electricity supply value chain those benefits arise. 
 The AER has the option to include the demand management incentive scheme DMIS as part of the DNSPs distribution determination. The application of the scheme can 
differ by DNSP. 
 The AER can amend the incentive scheme in accordance with the distribution consultation procedures. 
 The demand management incentive scheme must be applied in a manner consistent with the following principles: 
o DSP DM projects should must address an underlying (current and/or anticipated) network issue in order to qualify for inclusion in the incentive scheme (potential 
network issues include: network supply capacity, reliability, asset replacement and changing demand or local generation patterns) 
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o Expenditure on the DM projects approved under this scheme must be treated the same as equitably with other network expenditure approved under the normal 
expenditure determination process. 
o Notwithstanding the item 2 above, that the consideration of funding for qualifying DSP DM projects shall recognise the need to incentivise networks DM over the 
long term and not just for the forthcoming regulatory period. 
o Payments to customers or other providers of DM services any reward available under the scheme should reflect the consideration of timing of benefits in order to 
smooth the bill impact on consumers. 
o The scheme design should be as simple as practicable to apply, such that the incentive design it is easy to understand, implement and administer for all market 
participants. 
o The scheme should contribute to achieving a material change that maximises in the amount of efficient DSP DM in the market. 
 As one purpose of the incentive scheme shall could be to build capability among DNSPs in planning and implementing DSP DM, the scheme should include requirements 
regarding the monitoring of DSP DM project outcomes and publication of results as a means for maximising the impact of the incentive scheme expenditures. 
 In developing the demand management incentive scheme, the AER must have regard to: 
o Where available, past experience (in Australia and internationally) including costs, benefits and outcomes market rates for comparative DSP DM services; 
o the need to include consider in the cost-benefit assessment the value to customers participating in the DSP DM project of any significant additional cost or benefit 
of their participation (including the electricity they would have used or wasted except for that participation); 
o the range of market benefits permitted under the regulatory investment test for distribution; 
o the effect of the particular control mechanism to which the DNSP is subject on incentives to adopt or implement efficient non-network alternatives; 
o the extent a distributor is able to offer efficient pricing structures; 
o any possible interaction with other incentive schemes; and 
o the need to develop an efficient, fair and competitive market for DM services; 
o the willingness of customers to pay for any increases in costs or prices resulting from the implementation of the scheme; and 
o the distribution of any benefits of reduced costs or bills resulting from the implementation of the scheme. 
 The AER shall decide what information is needed from the DNSPs to monitor the application of the demand management incentive scheme and to verify outcomes. 
 The AER shall publish the demand management incentive scheme no later than nine months after the commencement of this rule.  
2. Calculation of the share of non-network market benefits 
 Recognising the barriers to network DM, the AER shall provide DNSPs with incentives to undertake efficient DM. 
 Under the scheme, the DNSP network is permitted to retain a share of associated non-network related market benefits of DM as determined by the AER, if 
a) the DNSP has made a material contribution to this DM, and  




RESTORING POWER: CUTTING BILLS & CARBON EMISSIONS WITH DEMAND MANAGEMENT  46 
b) the DM is unlikely to have been delivered without the DNSP’s support. 
 The value of the incentive share of associated non-network related market benefits retained by the DNSP must be proportional to the net benefits delivered to the market. 
 We propose that tThe maximum percentage of non-network related market benefits which can be retained by network businesses DNSPs shall be determined by the AER 
but should not exceed 50% (the actual percentage can vary by business and by time). 
 Any standardised values for non-network benefits used to calculate the value of the incentive must be broadly consistent with the RIT-D guidelines. 
 Methodologies used to determine the extent of the consumer demand response should be consistent with baseline consumption methodologies approved for the demand 
response mechanism proposed for the wholesale market where the circumstances are similar, except where the DNSP can provide justification for a different value being 
used. 
3. Innovation Allowance 
 Introduce a new clause which permits tThe AER shall establish a DM to approve an innovation allowance scheme for research and development activities related to DSP DM.  
 Note that tThe objective of the innovation allowance scheme shall should be to provide funding for, and an incentive to, DNSPs to undertaken activities that will increase 
their knowledge regarding (a) the ability of different approaches (both technology and pricing based) to achieve useful and reliable demand reductions, (b) the costs of those 
approaches, and (c) their impacts (if any) on network systems operations. 
 The AER should have has the flexibility to determine the amount of the innovation allowance for each distribution business (noting that these amounts could vary by 
business and over time). 
 The AER should have has the discretion to develop the design of the innovation allowance scheme subject to the scheme being simple for it and the DNSPs to administer 
(i.e., that its associated transaction costs are appropriate). 
 Businesses must provide all relevant information and data arising from such pilots/trials approved under this scheme to the AER in a timely manner and that all such 
information be available for publication unless reason for confidentiality is established to the satisfaction of the AER 
 Results of the projects approved under this scheme must be published in the DNSP's distribution annual planning report. 
4. Include allowance for foregone profit revenue under the DMIS 
 In order to treat DM equally with other network expenditure, the AER shall ensure that allowance is made to allow DNSPs to recovery revenue lost as a consequence of the 
DNSP undertaking any approved DM project. (Note, in the case of DNSPs operating under a revenue cap control mechanism, there will not be foregone revenue.) 
 Revenue lost by the DNSP is only recoverable in relation to DM projects undertaken by the DNSP. 
 Lost revenue can be used as a starting point for calculation of lost profit associated with any approved DSP project. 
 In calculating foregone profit revenue, the AER must have regard to the tariff structure and costs of the DNSP network business. 
5. Capital and Operating Expenditure Objectives 
 Amend NER Clauses 6.5.6 (a) to (c) and 6.5.7(a) to (c) to enable the AER to consider potential non-network benefits when assessing the efficiency of proposed DSP DM 
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activities included in business revenue proposal. 
Issues for the Rule change process to consider (as noted by the AEMC): 
1. What should be the maximum cap for the proportion of non-network related markets benefits which can be retained by the network businesses? With respect to the share of 
network benefits this is likely to be determined by the capital expenditure incentive scheme applied to the DNSP. 
2. Should the ability of networks to seek funding under the demand management incentive scheme be limited to the distribution determination process or should the businesses 
be able to seek funding within the regulatory period as well? One of the advantages of DSP DM projects is that they can have a shorter lead time than a capital works 
programme – sometimes less than a year. One of the disadvantages is that it is difficult to pin down specific costs a long way ahead of time – customers are generally not 
willing or able to commit to participate in a scheme years ahead of seeing any benefits from it. 
3. What risks to the network businesses could arise from the AER’s ability to impose performance standards and fines/penalties for non-compliance? What is the magnitude of 
these risks and therefore their potential impacts on the ability of the proposed incentive mechanisms to achieve their objectives? 
4. Should the AER be required to develop and provide deemed standardised values for the non-network market benefits? If not, should the scheme specify how such values 
should be developed for use in the scheme by the network businesses and how they will be evaluated by the AER? 
5. What should the name of the revised scheme be?  
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C. NOTES ON PROPOSED DM INCENTIVE SCHEME 
DM Performance Allowance Example 
The following is a worked example of the proposed formula for the DM 
performance allowance, set out above in Section 1: Proposals. 
Nominated Performance Target (NPT) = 100MW (or 100MVA) in say, 2016 
Performance threshold (Ɵ) = 80% 
Peak Demand Reduction (DMP) = 110MW 
DMP(t) = DMP – Ɵ. NPT  
 = 110 – (80% x 100)  
 = 30 MW 
i.e. the Peak Demand Reduction beyond the performance threshold (Ɵ) of NPT 
RAB = $10 billion 
Peak Demand (PD) = 5000 MW 
CAPEX PDC = RAB/ PD = $10b/ 5000 MW = $2m/MW 
i.e. the Capital Expenditure ‘Peak Demand Coefficient’ (PDC) – the DNSP’s Regulated 
Asset Base (RAB) divided by its the network-wide peak demand  
WACC = 8% 
DMPA = DMP(t) x WACC x CAPEX PDC 
 = 30MW x 8% x $2/MW  
  = $4.8 million 
Note: DNSPs are also recovering DM costs through AER-approved expenditure in 
DM plans. 




0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140 150 160 170 180 190 200
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
20 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
30 0 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
40 0 1 2 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
50 0 1 2 3 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
60 0 1 2 3 4 3 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
70 0 1 2 3 4 5 4 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
80 0 1 2 3 4 6 5 4 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
90 0 1 2 3 4 6 7 5 4 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
100 0 1 2 3 4 6 7 7 6 4 3 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
110 0 1 2 3 4 6 7 8 7 6 4.8 4 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
120 0 1 2 3 4 6 7 8 9 8 6 5 4 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
130 0 1 2 3 4 6 7 8 9 9 8 7 5 4 3 2 0 0 0 0 0
140 0 1 2 3 4 6 7 8 9 10 10 8 7 6 4 3 2 1 0 0 0
150 0 1 2 3 4 6 7 8 9 10 11 10 9 7 6 5 4 2 1 0 0
160 0 1 2 3 4 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 10 9 8 6 5 4 3 1 0
170 0 1 2 3 4 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 12 11 9 8 7 5 4 3 2
180 0 1 2 3 4 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 12 11 10 8 7 6 4 3
190 0 1 2 3 4 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 12 11 10 9 7 6 5
200 0 1 2 3 4 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 15 14 13 12 10 9 8 6
$ Million
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D. AER DEMAND MANAGEMENT REFORMS 
Reform of DMIS 
In 2011 the National Energy Rules (NER) were amended to allow the Australian 
Energy Regulator (AER) to develop and publish a new incentive scheme for demand 
management and embedded generation. The scheme is currently termed the 
Demand Management and Embedded Generation Connection Incentive Scheme 
(DMEGCIS). The Rules state that the DMEGCIS is to ‘provide incentives for 
Distribution Network Service Providers to implement efficient non-network 
alternatives, or to manage the expected demand for standard control services in 
some other way, or to efficiently connect Embedded Generators’.  
In 2012, as part of the Regulatory Determination for 2014–2019 for NSW and ACT, 
the AER proposed amendments to its demand management incentive scheme 
applying to network businesses. The main proposals were a name change, a 
broadening of the scope of the scheme to include embedded generation, and 
removal of the D-factor scheme. The proposed demand management and 
embedded generation connection incentive scheme (DMEGCIS) was therefore 
intended to function in the next regulatory control period in the same manner as 
the DMIS in this regulatory period, including: 
 a demand management innovation allowance provided as annual ex-ante 
allowance 
 provisions to enable DNSPs to recover revenue foregone that is directly 
attributable to a non-tariff demand management project approved under above 
(does not apply to revenue caps). 66 
Work on this proposal was halted when it became clear that the Australian Energy 
Market Commission’s (AEMC) ‘Power of Choice’ review would include 
recommendations on the form the DMEGCIS should take.  
Following the release of the ‘Power of Choice’ report, the AER released a DMEGCIS 
information paper in March 2013, proposing that the previous reform process from 
2012 be closed off, with the current scheme maintained for the current regulatory 
period, and for a one-year transition period in the following regulatory period, 
while the reform process is finalised. 
Given the recent election, and the delay until the next SCER meeting, it is possible 
that SCER will not submit a rule change request until the end of the year. Once the 
rule change request is submitted, the AEMC will begin consultations around the 
proposed rule. Once initiated, a rule change request process generally takes a 
minimum of six months. Once the AEMC finalises the rule change process, the AER 
will then begin its own formal consultations, which will take a further four months 
approximately to conclude. 
This means there is a distinct possibility that the new form of the DMEGCIS will not 
be decided upon in time for the NSW/ACT Regulatory determination for 2015–
2019.67 If this is the case, the AER has indicated they will request a Transitional 
Rule from the AEMC allowing it to introduce the new DMEGCIS partway through 
the regulatory control period for NSW/ACT and other jurisdictions as necessary.  
Should the AEMC wait for the SCER Rule Change Request, the current demand 
management incentive schemes could continue to operate in their current form 
until the end of the next regulatory periods in 2020.  
Table 5: Indicative reform process 
Step Time frame* 
SCER submits rule change request Approx 6 months 
AEMC initiates rule change request process 
Min. 6, possibly 
12+ months 
AER undertakes informal consultations and participates 
in AEMC consultations 
As per above 
AEMC finalises rule change process, likely resulting in a 
request for the AER to develop a new DMIS in 
accordance with changed Rule(s). 
 
AER initiates formal process to develop DMIS  Approx. 4months 
DMIS introduced during AER Determinations, or as 
specified by transitional rule 
 
Total 18–24 months 
* Timeframes are ‘best guesses’ based on current information. 
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Regulatory investment test for distribution (RIT-D) 
Electricity distribution companies undertake numerous investment projects 
each year to augment parts of their networks. The AEMC’s Final Rule 
Determination, ‘Expansion Network Framework’, requires the AER to develop 
and publish a new Regulatory Investment Test for Distribution (RIT-D) to 
replace the current regulatory test for distribution projects. The RIT-D is 
designed to take place before significant distribution network investment 
decisions are made and will apply to all projects over $5 million.68 
The AER aims to develop the RIT-D in a way that ensures RIT-D proponents duly 
assess all credible options (including both network and non-network options) 
before choosing the most cost-effective option available to meet consumer 
demand. Application guidelines will be developed by the AER to guide RIT-D 
proponents in applying the RIT-D, and will include a specific methodology for 
valuing classes of benefits. The aim is to enhance transparency and consistency 
in investment decision-making. 
The effectiveness of the RIT-D in facilitating DM will depend on how the 
guidelines are written, including whether and how ‘benefits’ are assessed. In 
any case, if NSPs do not face balanced incentives for undertaking DM then the 
effectiveness of the RIT-D in encouraging efficient uptake of DM will be limited. 
Furthermore, the RIT-D will only apply to projects over $5m and evidence to 
date shows that there are (and are likely to continue to be) many projects that 
fall under this threshold. 
An issues paper was released by the AER in January 2013, followed by public 
submissions in February 2013. The final RIT-D and its application guidelines was 
scheduled for release by 31 August 2013. 
Distribution network pricing rules 
The AEMC has proposed changes to pricing principles to ensure prices are cost 
reflective. This includes requiring more consultation to give retailers and 
consumers more control in developing pricing tariffs (particularly the 
structure/nature of tariffs). 
As discussed above, SCER’s decision regarding specific recommendations related to 
flexible (i.e. time-of-use) pricing was to leave control over pricing models to 
jurisdictional governments. SCER has however, agreed ‘in principle’ to changes to 
the pricing principles and have agreed to submit a rule change proposal to the 
AEMC. From the AER’s point of view, the reforms to efficient pricing in the Rules 
should result in more detailed pricing reviews. The AER will likely also have an 
expanded role which will include advising on pricing principles and setting out 
detailed guidelines on how the consultation with retailers and consumers will need 
to occur. The AER plans to participate in the AEMC consultation following 
submission of the rule change request. 
These more cost reflective tariffs could play out in different ways. For example, as 
some networks have invested heavily in network infrastructure, there may be a 
temptation to shift charges from volume-related components into fixed-charge 
components. This would likely reduce consumers’ capacity to reduce bills through 
energy savings and therefore reduce their level of interest DM programs. On the 
other hand, flexible pricing may encourage DM by promoting more peak focused 
cost-reflective Time of Use (TOU) tariffs. 
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Expenditure Incentives Review 
These guidelines will set out how the AER will improve incentives for electricity 
network businesses to ensure efficient capital expenditure, so customers only 
fund the investment necessary to provide a safe and reliable network.  
As part of this, the AER is also reviewing the incentives for efficient operating 
expenditure. In particular, it is considering revisions to the current efficiency 
benefit sharing scheme that applies to the approach that network businesses 
take to expenditure assessments. 
The review aims to address the following issues with the current capex 
incentives: 
 the imbalance between capex and opex incentives 
 the incentive for efficient capex declines over the regulatory control period, 
encouraging overspending in later years 
 that NSPs can choose to ignore the incentive of obtaining revenue savings, 
knowing that any capex spend will ultimately be rolled into the Regulated 




An issues paper was released in March 2013, with stakeholder consultations 
expected in late May 2013. Guidelines are expected to be finalised by November 
2013.69 The issues paper addresses both ‘ex ante’ measures put in place at the 
beginning of a regulatory control period to properly incentivise efficient capex, 
and ‘ex post’ measures to apply at the end of a regulatory control period, to 
correct for inefficient capex spending. The AER has expressed its preference for 
ex ante measures to remain the principal method for incentivising, but is 
proposing to consider ex post measures where a significant capex overspend has 
occurred and where the ex post assessment has uncovered clear cases of 
inefficiency or imprudent behaviour by the NSP. 
The AER’s proposal for the primary capex ex ante measure is a continuous, 
asymmetric Capital Expenditure Sharing Scheme (CESS). The continuous nature 
of the scheme would ensure constant incentives in each year of the regulatory 
control period, and the asymmetric nature (e.g. greater penalty than reward) 
would provide stronger protection for consumers. The reward for 
underspending by NSPs would be 20–30% of the discrepancy either way, while 
the penalty would be greater than 30%.70 
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E. EXAMPLES OF NETWORK DM 
‘Talking Power’ enhances consumer engagement 
As network businesses enter a future characterised by significant changes in 
government policy, network and consumer-side technology, industry regulation 
and retail price reform, greater participation of consumers in decision-making 
will deliver better outcomes. 
SA Power Networks is South Australia’s sole electricity distributor, delivering 
power to more than 835,000 homes and businesses across the state. As it 
prepares its plans for managing the state’s electricity distribution network in the 
2016–2020 regulatory period, SA Power Networks has commenced extensive 
community consultation in an innovative engagement program called Talking 
Power. 
 
Talking Power is focused on SA Power Networks’ residential and commercial 
customers, and aims to listen to and understand their views, needs and 
priorities for the distribution network. A comprehensive engagement plan, to 
take place over 2013 and 2014, will feature consumer and stakeholder 
workshops, an online consumer survey and regular stakeholder updates. 
Realising that it is important for customers to have a clear communication 
channel throughout the process, the Talking Power website will support every 
stage of the engagement process. This will be the one-stop shop for all things 
regarding SA Power Networks’ 2016–2020 regulatory proposal. 
www.talkingpower.com.au  
The Smart Home Family 
The Smart Home was built by Ausgrid and Sydney Water to test what life is like 
for a family living with the latest energy- and water-efficient technologies. The 
Smart Home is being tested by a real family, in real time with information 
broadcast via the internet. 
The Smart Home is now being tested by its second family and follows the 
success of the original family. Everyone uses energy differently, and this second 
trial enables Ausgrid to see how the home performs with a different family. 
This family is among the first to trial technologies to be tested in the Australian 
Government’s $100 million Smart Grid, Smart City project. The home 
showcases more than 20 energy- and water-efficient appliances, efficient 
lighting and a standby power device. 
The Smart Grid, Smart City demonstration project trials new technologies 
designed to make the electricity grid more efficient and give households more 
information and control over their energy use and costs. 
This Smart Home allows the wider community to share the experience and is an 
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Information at your fingertips – web portals 
Jemena’s Electricity Outlook is a free self-service web portal that gives smart 
meter customers greater control of their electricity use and power bills. 
 
Combined with advanced metering technology, Electricity Outlook enables 
consumers to better understand their usage and costs on a daily basis. The 
compare function on the portal also allows consumers to determine if they have 
the retail price-offering that best suits their consumption needs. 
In the short term the web portal also allows consumers to notice unexpected 
levels of use and take immediate action by switching off appliances if they 
choose. In the long term, the web portal can arm households with the 
information they need to make a long-term investment in technologies that 
change their energy use. 
Jemena distributes electricity to more than 320,000 customer sites and is 
playing a key part in the roll-out of advanced metering technology in Victoria, 
having installed more than 177,000 smart meters in its network area. 
www.jemena.com.au  
Positive Payback – it pays to save 
In South East Queensland, Energex provides 59% of its customers with a 
demand management service, with features such as off-peak power for hot 
water, pool filtration and air conditioning. 
Energex’s latest initiative is the Positive Payback Program which rewards 
customers for buying and using energy-efficient appliances. 
Customers can receive gift cards for choosing PeakSmart air conditioners. 
These air conditioners have a device which automatically reduces energy use at 
times of peak demand, saving the customer money and easing demand on the 
grid. Other customers can choose to install the device in their existing units. 
Thanks to a partnership of networks, manufactures and retailers, more than 
129 PeakSmart models are now available to customers. Altogether, some 
30,000 customers are involved in one or more of the air conditioner and pool 
pump programs and this, along with commercial and industrial programs, has 
resulted in more than 100 MVA of load being removed from Energex’s summer 
peak demand. 
Importantly, information collected from the peak demand programs has 
provided detailed facts and figures for use by the Commonwealth 
Government’s Equipment Energy Efficiency Committee review into ‘smart 
appliances’. 
Reducing the surges in peak demand created by air conditioners allows 
network businesses to defer costly upgrades to network capacity for the 
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F. DM SCHEME PRECEDENTS 
Queensland Energy Conservation and DM program 
This program was implemented in 2011. The DM 
targets are not legislated, but guided by policy 
direction from government. 
Main elements of the scheme are: 
 It aims to help avoid the equivalent of 1000 MW, 
saving more than $3.5 billion in avoided network 
and generation costs. 
 Part of these savings will come from DM targets 
adopted by distributors of 144 MW (Energex) and 
103 MW (Ergon). 
 Initial funds ($47 million) were provided by the Qld 
Government. Subsequent program cost recovery was sought and approved via 
AER (~$220million). 
 If performance targets are not met, the AER may disallow cost recovery. 
 
Achievements 
 In both 2011–12 and the previous year, Energex’s DM programs are 
meeting its targets in its key commercial/industrial initiatives (42.6 and 
26.1 MVA compared to targets of 42 and 26 MVa respectively) and 
exceeding them by almost double in its residential DM initiatives (23.4 
and 15.4 MVA compared to targets of 12.5 and 8 MVa respectively).71 
 In 2011–12, Ergon DM activities delivered 36MW of demand reductions, 
exceeding the 25MW target set for the year. With 17MW of peak 
demand reductions the previous year, Ergon is well positioned to 
achieve its target of 103MW saving by 2015.72 
 
South Australian DM Fund73 
ESCOSA, the state’s electricity regulator, developed a demand management 
framework based on a cost–benefit analysis that outlined power factor 
correction, standby generation, residential direct load control and aggregation 
as potentially applicable demand management measures for the South 
Australian market. South Australia’s sole distributor, ETSA Utilities, was 
required to work closely with ESCOSA on the demand management program, 
and was subject to specific reporting requirements for each initiative. 
The main elements of the initiative are: 
 ESCOSA provided an allowance of $20 million for a range of pilot demand 
management initiatives in the 2005–10 Distribution Price Determination. 
 Allowances for demand management are treated as operating expenditure, 
and are not imputed into demand forecasts, capex or the regulatory asset 
base. The classification of these initiatives as opex is a decision based on 
their ‘pilot nature’. 
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Ontario Electricity Conservation and Demand  
Management Program 
Legislation introduced in 2009 allowed the setting of 
Conservation and Demand Management (CDM) 
targets for distributors as a condition of licence. 
The main elements of the program are: 
 Overall targets issued by Minister:  
1,330MW between2011 and 2014 
6,000 GWhpa between 2010 and 2014.  
 Individual targets set by the Energy Board, 
following advice from the Power Authority 
(advice based on direct consultation with 
distributors). 
 Results are achieved through the use of province-wide CDM programs 
made available by the Power Authority. 
 DM costs are recovered via a regulatory structure. 
 Performance incentives accrue to networks once 80% of their CDM 
target is reached (max 150%). 
 
Achievements 
 Overall in 2011, distributors reported spending a total of $94,129,770 on 
CDM programs across Ontario to achieve 215,651 kW of peak demand 
savings 
 Most distributors achieved at least 10% of their overall target in their first 
year. Four distributors achieving over 60%, another four over 30% and 
seven over 20%. 
 
California efficiency savings and demand reduction targets 
California implemented broad legislation in 2006 to set an overall target of 10% 
reduction in consumption within 10 years. It also required the California Energy 
Commission (CEC), the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) and other 
interested parties to develop a state-wide estimate of all cost-effective electricity and 
natural gas savings and to develop efficiency savings and demand reduction targets for 
the next 10 years. 
The main elements of the scheme are: 
 CPUC built on existing peak demand targets for 2004–2013 for each of the three 
investor-owned electrical utilities, extending these out to 2020. Targets from 2012 
to 2020 total 4.5GW across the three utilities. 
 The required energy savings will be primarily met through incentive programs for 
utility customers but utilities can also count energy savings from government 
policies such as state building codes, federal and state appliance standards and 
state-wide market transformation efforts. 
Californian incentive/penalty mechanism: Utility ratepayers and shareholders ‘share the 
savings’ from EE programs. Financial rewards are balanced by penalties for poor 
performance, tied to Commission-adopted kW, kWh and therm savings goals. 
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Other International schemes74 
Region Target  Legislated? Funding Penalties/Rewards 
Colorado, US 5% of 2006 peak demand by 2018 Legislation provides minimum targets 
but authorised Public Utility 
Commission to revise goals and 
establish interim targets 
Tariff riders on customer bills Disincentive offset and 
performance incentive 
Delaware, US 15% of 2007 peak electric demand by 2015 
(2011 = 52MW, 2015 = 392 MW) 
Targets set in legislation TBD but may include 
volumetric charge to 
customers 
Unknown 
Florida, US Summer: 3,024 MW  
Winter: 1,937 MW  
(cumulative from 2010–2019) 
Public Service Commission sets goals Unknown None at this stage. 
Illinois, US 0.1% reduction in peak demand each year for 
10 years (EY 2009–2019) 
Legislation sets overall annual targets Cost-recovery tariffs Non-compliance with plans 
requires utilities to make 
contribution to the Energy 
Efficiency Trust Fund 
Maine, US 100 MW reduction in peak load electricity 
consumption by 2020 
Targets set in the Act Cost-recovery rates with limits Unknown 
Maryland, US From 2007 level, 5% reduction in per capita 
peak demand by 2011, 10% by 2013, and 15% 
by 2015 
Targets set in legislation Cost-recovery rates with no 
specific limits 
Unknown 
Missouri, US Annual 1% peak reduction, cumulative 
reduction of 9% by 2020, increasing by 1% 
each year thereafter 
Cumulative target set in legislation, 
annual targets set by Public Service 
Commission 
TBD  Unknown 
Ohio, US 1% reduction in peak demand in 2009, 0.75% 
reduction in peak demand each year through 
2018 
Targets set in legislation Unknown Non-compliance will result in 
forfeiture to be paid to the 
Advanced Energy Fund 
Pennsylvania
US 
No current targets. Previous targets were 
savings of 4.5% by May 31, 2013, measured 
against actual peak demand from June 2007–
May 2008 
Targets set in legislation Reconcilable adjustment 
clause to rates 
Failure to achieve targets is 
punishable by fines. 
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Rhode Island, 
US 
Summer: Range from 18,512 kW in 2011 to 
32,759 kW in 2014; Winter range from 
17,197kW in 2011 to 30,432 kW in 2014 
Public Utilities Commission sets targets Volumetric rate surcharge Unknown 
Texas, US 30% of electric demand growth in 2013 
0.4% of each company’s peak demand 
Individual targets set in legislation Included in customer tariffs, 
as monthly or volumetric basis 
Performance bonus for 
exceeding goal within cost 
imit. 
Vermont, US Summer peak savings: 60,800 kW (three-year 
goal for 2012–2014). No winter peak target. 
Public Service Board set targets 
following submissions by utilities and 
workshop with a number of 
stakeholders including Utilities. 
Volumetric charge on 
customer bills 
Positive performance awards 
for meeting stretch KPIs, and 
forfeiture of portions of 
performance award for failing 
to meet other minimum QPIs. 
 
Other countries that have implemented DM targets or similar initiatives that may impact on peak demand include: Belgium, Brazil, Denmark, France, Italy, Thailand and the 
United Kingdom*  
(*see Total Environment Centre, 2012, Demand management targets for networks in the National Electricity Market (Discussion Paper) 
 
  




RESTORING POWER: CUTTING BILLS & CARBON EMISSIONS WITH DEMAND MANAGEMENT  58 
G. REFERENCES AND NOTES
                                                          
1
 Australian Energy Market Commission, 2012, Power of Choice Review - Giving consumers options in the way they use electricity (Final Report). 
2
 Australian Energy Market Operator, 2013 Electricity Statement of Opportunity, August 2013  
3
 Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal, 2012, Review of regulated retail prices and charges for electricity 2013 to 2016 
4
 Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism, 2012, Electricity Prices (factsheet) 
5
 Langham et al., 2010, Building Our Savings: Reduced infrastructure costs from improving building energy efficiency. Institute for Sustainable Futures, University of Technology Sydney. 
6
 Productivity Commission, 2012, Electricity Network Regulation (Draft report), Melbourne: PC 
7
 Productivity Commission, 2013, Electricity Network Regulatory Frameworks, Report No. 62, Canberra 
8
 Futura Consulting, 2011, Power of choice – giving consumers options in the way they use electricity. 
9
 Australian Energy Market Commission, 2012, Power of Choice Review - Giving consumers options in the way they use electricity (Final Report). 
10
 Australian Energy Market Commission, 2012, Power of Choice Review - Giving consumers options in the way they use electricity (Final Report). 
11
 Productivity Commission, 2013, Electricity Network Regulatory Frameworks, Report No. 62, Canberra 
12
 ClimateWorks, 2013, National Rule Reforms Will Boost Cleaner Energy, http://www.climateworksaustralia.org/story/media-release/national-rule-reforms-will-boost-cleaner-energy 
13
 Ison, N., Usher, J., Cantley-Smith, R., Harris, S. and Dunstan, C., 2011, The NEM Report Card: How well does the National Electricity Market serve Australia? Prepared for the Total Environment Centre by 
the Institute for Sustainable Futures and the Monash University Faculty of Law. 
14
 Australian Energy Regulator, 2009, New South Wales distribution determination: 2009–10 to 2013–14 (Final decision), p.265 
http://www.aer.gov.au/sites/default/files/NSW%20DNSPs%20final%20decision%2028%20April%202009.pdf 
15
 Dunstan, C., S. Sharpe and J. Downes, 2013, Investing in Savings: Finance and Cooperative Approaches to Electricity Demand Management – A scoping study for the Clean Energy Finance Corporation, 
Institute for Sustainable Futures, University of Technology, Sydney 
16
 Dunstan, C., S. Sharpe and J. Downes, 2013, Investing in Savings: Finance and Cooperative Approaches to Electricity Demand Management – A scoping study for the Clean Energy Finance Corporation, 
Institute for Sustainable Futures, University of Technology, Sydney 
17
 Dunstan, C., S. Sharpe and J. Downes, 2013, Investing in Savings: Finance and Cooperative Approaches to Electricity Demand Management – A scoping study for the Clean Energy Finance Corporation, 
Institute for Sustainable Futures, University of Technology, Sydney 
18
 Ison, N., Usher, J., Cantley-Smith, R., Harris, S. and Dunstan, C., 2011, The NEM Report Card: How well does the National Electricity Market serve Australia? Prepared for the Total Environment Centre by 
the Institute for Sustainable Futures and the Monash University Faculty of Law. 
19
 Office of Gas and Electricity Markets UK (OFGEM). nd. The Gas and Electricity Markets Authority. Retrieved January 2011 from www.ofgem.gov.uk/About%20us/Authority/Pages/TheAuthority.aspx 
20
 Canadian National Energy Board, 2011, Strategic Plan. Retrieved 2011 14-April from http://www.neb-one.gc.ca/clf-nsi/rthnb/whwrndrgvrnnc/strtgcpln-eng.html  
21
 Productivity Commission, 2012, Electricity Network Regulation (Draft report), Melbourne: PC 
22
 Australian Energy Market Operator, 2013 Electricity Statement of Opportunity, August 2013  
23
 Mountain, B.R., 2011, Australia’s rising electricity prices and declining productivity: the contribution of its electricity distributors, Energy Users Association of Australia, Melbourne 
24 Langham, E., Dunstan, C., Walgenwitz, G., Denvir, P., Lederwasch, A., and Landler, J.2010, Building our Savings:  Reduced Infrastructure Costs from Improving Building Energy Efficiency. 
25
 Australian Energy Market Commission, 2012, Power of Choice Review - Giving consumers options in the way they use electricity (Final Report). 




RESTORING POWER: CUTTING BILLS & CARBON EMISSIONS WITH DEMAND MANAGEMENT  59 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
26
 Australian Energy Market Commission, 2012, Power of Choice Review - Giving consumers options in the way they use electricity (Final Report). 
27
 NERA Consulting, 2012, Peak Energy Savings Scheme Design Options: A Report for the Energy Savings Initiative Secretariat, Prepared for the Commonwealth Department of Resources, Energy and 
Tourism. 
28 Australian Energy Market Commission, 2013, Schedule of Reliability Settings (MPC and CPT for 2013-2014) 
29
 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2013, Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis (Working Group I, Fifth Assessment Report) 
30
 OECD 2012, OECD Environmental Outlook to 2050 
31
 Climate Commission, 2013, The Critical Decade: Global Action Building on Climate Change 
32
 Department of Industry, Innovation, Climate Change, Science, Research and Tertiary Education, 2013, Quarterly Update of Australia’s National Greenhouse Gas Inventory, December Quarter 2012 
33
 Pitt & Sherry, 2013, Continuing fall in electricity demand sees further reduction in NEM emissions (webpage) http://www.pittsh.com.au/news/continuing-fall-in-electricity-demand-sees-further-
reduction-in-nem-emissions 
34
 Ison, N., Usher, J., Cantley-Smith, R., Harris, S. and Dunstan, C., 2011, The NEM Report Card: How well does the National Electricity Market serve Australia? Prepared for the Total Environment Centre by 
the Institute for Sustainable Futures and the Monash University Faculty of Law. 
35
 Australian Energy Market Commission, 2012, Power of Choice Review – Giving consumers options in the way they use electricity (Final Report)  
36
 Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal, 2004, Consultation Group Draft Guidelines on the Application of the Tribunal’s 2004 Demand Management Determination, 
http://efa.com.au/Library/IPARTDraftGuidelinesre2004DMDetermination.pdf  
37
 Dunstan, C., Giotto, N. & Ross, K., 2011, Report of the 2010 Survey of Electricity Network Demand Management in Australia (SENDMA). Prepared for the Australian Alliance to Save Energy by the 
Institute for Sustainable Futures, University of Technology, Sydney. 
38
 Ison, N., Usher, J., Cantley-Smith, R., Harris, S. and Dunstan, C., 2011, The NEM Report Card: How well does the National Electricity Market serve Australia? Prepared for the Total Environment Centre by 
the Institute for Sustainable Futures and the Monash University Faculty of Law. 
39
 Productivity Commission, 2013, Electricity Network Regulatory Frameworks, Report No. 62, Canberra 
40
 Australian Energy Regulator, 2013, Demand management incentive scheme assessment report 2011-12. 
41
 Dunstan, C., et al, 2011, Institutional Barriers to Intelligent Grid (Working Paper 4.1). Prepared for the CSIRO Intelligent Grid Research Program by the Institute for Sustainable Futures, University of 
Technology Sydney. 
42
 Dunstan, C., Ross, K.E. & Ghiotto, N. 2011, Barriers to demand management: A survey of stakeholder perceptions, Prepared for the Australian Alliance to Save Energy by the Institute for Sustainable 
Futures, UTS, Sydney, Australia. 
43
 Ison, N., Usher, J., Cantley-Smith, R., Harris, S. and Dunstan, C., 2011, The NEM Report Card: How well does the National Electricity Market serve Australia? Prepared for the Total Environment Centre by 
the Institute for Sustainable Futures and the Monash University Faculty of Law. 
44
 Dunstan, C., Ross, K.E. & Ghiotto, N. 2011, Barriers to demand management: A survey of stakeholder perceptions, Prepared for the Australian Alliance to Save Energy by the Institute for Sustainable 
Futures, UTS, Sydney, Australia. 
45
 Productivity Commission, 2013, Electricity Network Regulatory Frameworks, Report No. 62, Canberra 
46
 Productivity Commission, 2013, Electricity Network Regulatory Frameworks, Report No. 62, Canberra 
47
 Australian Energy Regulator, 2013, Information Paper: Demand Management and Embedded Generation Connection Incentive Scheme. 
48
 Productivity Commission, 2013, Electricity Network Regulatory Frameworks, Report No. 62, Canberra 
49
 Australian Energy Market Commission, 2012, Power of Choice Review – Giving consumers options in the way they use electricity (Final Report). 




RESTORING POWER: CUTTING BILLS & CARBON EMISSIONS WITH DEMAND MANAGEMENT  60 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
50
 Dunstan, C., Giotto, N. & Ross, K., 2011, Report of the 2010 Survey of Electricity Network Demand Management in Australia (SENDMA). Prepared for the Australian Alliance to Save Energy by the 
Institute for Sustainable Futures, University of Technology, Sydney. 
51 Productivity Commission, 2013, Electricity Network Regulatory Frameworks, Report No. 62, Canberra 
52
 Wright, G., 2012, Demand management targets for networks in the National Electricity Market, (Discussion Paper). Total Environment Centre, Sydney. 
53
 Standing Council on Energy Reform, n.d., Energy Market Reform (webpage) http://www.scer.gov.au/workstreams/energy-market-reform/  
54
 Standing Council on Energy Reform, 2012, Electricity: Putting Consumers First, https://scer.govspace.gov.au/files/2012/12/Putting-Consumers-First-December-2012.pdf 
55
 Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister for Resources and Energy, 2012, COAG Reaches Agreement On Electricity Market Reform (Media Release)  
56
 Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister for Resources and Energy, 2012, COAG Reaches Agreement On Electricity Market Reform (Media Release) 
57
 Standing Council on Energy Reform, 2013, Wholesale Market Demand Response in the National Electricity market (webpage), http://www.scer.gov.au/workstreams/energy-market-reform/demand-
side-participation/wholesale-market-demand-response-mechanism-in-the-national-electricity-market/ 
58
 Standing Council on Energy Reform, 2012, Electricity: Putting Consumers First, https://scer.govspace.gov.au/files/2012/12/Putting-Consumers-First-December-2012.pdf  
59
 NER CH.11.50 , v.59 and Australian Energy Market Commission, 2012, Rule Determination: National Electricity Amendment (Distribution Network Planning and Expansion Framework) Rule 2012.  
60
 Pricewaterhouse Coopers, 2012, Incentives for network driven DSP. Prepared for Energy Networks Association. 
61
 Australian Energy Regulator, nd, Better Regulation reform program (webpage), http://www.aer.gov.au/node/18824 
62
 Australian Energy Market Commission, 2012, Rule Determination: National Electricity Amendment (Economic Regulation of Network Service Providers) Rule. 
63
 Futura Consulting, 2011, Power of choice – giving consumers options in the way they use electricity. 
64
 Dunstan C, Langham E, and Ison N, 20 Policy Tools for Developing Distributed Energy (Working Paper 4.2), Prepared for the CSIRO Intelligent Grid Research Program by the Institute for Sustainable 
Futures, University of Technology Sydney. 
65
 Productivity Commission, 2013, Electricity Network Regulatory Frameworks, Report No. 62, Canberra 
66
 Australian Energy Regulator, 2012, Explanatory Statement: Proposed Demand Management and Embedded Generation Connection Incentive Scheme, New South Wales Distribution Network Services 
Providers.  
67
 NOTE: The current ACT/NSW regulatory control period ends on 30 June 2014. However the next ACT/NSW determination process has been deferred as a result of the AEMC’s November 2012 network 
regulation rule change. The period of 1 July 2014 to 30 June 2015 will be a transitional regulatory control period with a transitional determination made by the AER in April 2014, followed by a 
substantive determination in April 2015 for the subsequent regulatory control period (1 July 2015 - 30 June 2019).  
68
 Australian Energy Regulator, 2013, Regulatory investment test for distribution (RIT-D) and application guidelines (webpage), http://www.aer.gov.au/node/19146 
69
 Australian Energy Regulator, 2012, Expenditure incentives guidelines (webpage), http://www.aer.gov.au/node/18869 
70
 Australian Energy Regulator, 2013, Expenditure incentives guidelines for electricity network service providers; Issues paper. 
71
 Energex, 2012, Network Management Plan 2012/13 to 2016/17. 
72
 Ergon Energy, 2012, Demand Management Outcomes Report 2011-12. http://www.ergon.com.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0005/137183/DMP-Outcomes-2011-12.pdf. 
73
 ESCOSA 2005-2010 Electricity Distribution Price Determination Part A: Statement of Reasons April 2005, pp. 53 and 60. 
74
 American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy (ACEEE), 2012, State Energy Efficiency Policy Database (website). http://aceee.org/sector/state-policy/;  
N.C. Solar Center, DSIRE: Database of State Incentives for Renewables and Efficiency (webpage). http://www.dsireusa.org/incentives/index.cfm 
  
 
